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Abstract
Our understanding of how moral attitudes influence behavior has been greatly expanded by recent
research on moral conviction, but little has been done to identify factors that contribute to the formation
of moral conviction. The primary purpose of the present research was therefore to identify antecedents
to moral conviction. Across two studies, three potential antecedents were identified – reliance on the
Harm moral foundation, personal relevance, and attitude intensity. In study 1 (N = 469), high individual
reliance on the Harm moral foundation predicted stronger moral conviction. In study 2 (N = 460), high
personal relevance and greater attitude intensity predicted stronger moral conviction. Study 2 also tested
three separate hypotheses forwarded by the Integrated Theory of Moral Conviction (ITMC) – the
universality, objectivity, and emotion hypotheses. While results offered support for the objectivity and
emotion hypotheses, support for the universality hypothesis was equivocal. Future research is required
to determine the mechanism by which personal relevance increases moral conviction and the directional
links between emotion and moral conviction.
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General Introduction
The influence of attitudes on behavior has been a topic of interest and research for decades, with
current theory suggesting that attitudes of greater extremity, certainty, and importance exercise greater
influence over corresponding behaviors than attitudes of weaker extremity, certainty, and importance
(see Petty & Krosnick, 1995). However, few would argue that mere strong attitudes were the motivating
force behind terrorist attacks like 9/11 (Skitka, Bauman, & Sargis, 2005; Skitka & Mullen, 2002). Such
behaviors, Linda Skitka and colleagues argue, can be largely attributed to attitudes based on moral
beliefs (Mullen & Skitka, 2006; Skitka, 2010; Skitka & Bauman, 2008; Skitka, Bauman, & Lytle, 2009;
Skitka & Mullen, 2002).
Moral Mandates and Moral Conviction
Attitudes can vary with regard to whether they are rooted in subjective preference, normative
conventions, or moral beliefs (e.g.,Turiel, 2002). Attitudes rooted in preferences refer to positive and
negative evaluations based on personal taste and are not socially regulated. For example, a preference to
vacation at the beach versus in the mountains is based on individual taste. Attitudes rooted in normative
conventions are based on shared notions of how things are normally done in one’s group or culture and
are socially regulated. People within the boundary of the group are expected to adhere to these
normative conventions, whereas those outside the group are not. For attitudes rooted in moral beliefs,
however, evaluations are based on whether an object or behavior adheres to one’s moral principles.
Unlike attitudes based on preferences or convention, people expect/believe that these attitudes should
generalize and apply regardless of group membership – what is right is right and what is wrong is
wrong. Just as the roots of attitudes can vary, individuals vary with regard to whether the same attitude
object is viewed as preference, convention, or moral belief (Turiel, 2002). For example, some people
might have a negative stance toward capital punishment because it is illegal in their state (attitude based
on normative convention), but others might have the same negative stance because they believe it is
1

always wrong to kill another human being (attitude based on moral belief). This individual difference,
and the unique consequences that characterize attitudes based on moral beliefs, has been the subject of
recent research.
Linda Skitka (2010) refers to attitudes that develop out of moral beliefs as ‘moral mandates’.
Moral conviction, on the other hand, refers to strong, absolute beliefs that something is right or wrong
(Skitka & Mullen, 2002). When an attitude is held with moral conviction, then, this implies that the
attitude is based on strong moral beliefs. It has been argued that attitudes held with moral conviction are
qualitatively different from nonmoral attitudes, especially with regard to their behavioral consequences
(Skitka, 2010). For example, holding a strong attitude toward a specific issue is associated with lower
tolerance of attitudinally dissimilar others, but only for intimate social relationships (e.g., friends, people
who marry into the family). Moral conviction is also associated with lower tolerance of attitudinally
dissimilar others, but unlike strong nonmoral attitudes, this intolerance applies to both close and distant
relationships (e.g., neighbors, store owners; Skitka et al., 2005, studies 1, 2, & 3). Other consequences
of high moral conviction include increased difficulty resolving conflict (Skitka et al., 2005, study 4),
increased acceptance of violent means to achieve preferred ends (Skitka & Mullen, 2002), a lower
tendency to obey authorities and laws (Skitka et al., 2009), and greater motivation to vote (Skitka &
Bauman, 2008). These studies have expanded our understanding of how and when moral conviction can
negatively and positively influence behavior. The next step is to uncover the antecedents of moral
conviction, with the end goal of weakening moral conviction when consequences may be dire (e.g.,
violent behavior) or strengthening moral conviction when outcomes are desirable (e.g., greater voter
turnout). The present research drew upon Moral Foundations Theory (study 1) and the attitude strength
literature (study 2) in an initial attempt to identify moral conviction antecedents.
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Study 1 Introduction
Modern research on morality has been based primarily on the work of Lawrence Kohlberg
(1969) and Carol Gilligan (1982), who emphasized the importance of justice and care, respectively, as
the primary foundations of morality. However, Richard Shweder and colleagues (1997) have since
argued that justice and care do not fully characterize human morality. They argue that there are in fact
three different moral ‘ethics’ – the ethic of autonomy (which encompasses justice and care), the ethic of
community, and the ethic of divinity. Expanding on Shweder’s work, Moral Foundations Theory (MFT)
seeks to further explain the origins, development, and cultural variations of morality, and posits that
there are five psychological foundations upon which cultures construct concepts of morality (Haidt &
Graham, 2007; Haidt & Joseph, 2004). These foundations include Harm/Care, Fairness/Reciprocity,
Ingroup/Loyalty, Authority/Respect, and Purity/Sanctity. The Harm/Care foundation is related to
human concerns for caring, nurturing, and protecting the vulnerable. Fairness/Reciprocity aligns with
our concern for fairness and justice. Ingroup/Loyalty addresses matters of loyalty, patriotism, and selfsacrifice for the group. The foundation of Authority/Respect includes concepts such as obedience,
respect, leadership, and protection. The foundation of Purity/Sanctity encompasses concerns regarding
contamination, and the taming of humanity’s carnal nature (e.g., lust). The moral foundations proposed
by MFT are the primary focus of study 1.
The Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ; for review see Graham et al., 2011) measures the
extent to which people rely on the five moral foundations proposed by Moral Foundations Theory, and
research using the MFQ demonstrates that groups can vary in the extent to which they rely on these
foundations to define right and wrong. For example, Graham and colleagues (2009) discovered
differential endorsement of the five foundations between liberals and conservatives; liberals tend to
endorse the Harm/Care and Fairness/Reciprocity foundations to a greater extent than the other three
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foundations1, and conservatives endorse all five foundations fairly equally. But as previously noted,
individuals can vary with regard to whether their attitude is rooted in preference, social convention, or
moral belief. One person may have a negative attitude toward littering because it is illegal in their state
(convention) and another because they believe humans have a moral obligation to protect the
environment (moral belief). Thus identifying what leads one person to hold an attitude with high moral
conviction and another with low moral conviction is more a question of individual differences than
group differences. One way to further understand the formation of moral conviction is to identify
individual differences that explain why a person’s attitude becomes rooted in their moral beliefs. Two
such differences may be the extent to which individuals rely on the five moral foundations and the
extent to which individuals believe a specific issue is related to the five moral foundations.
Individual Differences
Jonathan Haidt and his colleagues (2009) draw an explicit link between McAdams’ personality
levels and the five moral foundations. McAdams (1995) pushes for a three-leveled approach to the
study of personality. Level 1, according to McAdams (1995), consists of dispositional traits (e.g., the
Big Five traits), which are largely stable regardless of the surrounding context or conditions. That is,
they tend not to change across time, place or roles. Level 2 contains personal concerns, which refer to
constructs such as motives, values, coping styles, current concerns, defense mechanisms, competencies,
and domain-specific interests. These differ from traits in several ways, most notably by the fact that
these constructs are contextualized by time, place, and/or role. Moreover, these constructs respond to
experimental manipulations, and are thus frequently used as independent and dependent variables in
research (Haidt, Graham, & Joseph, 2009). The third and last level contains what McAdams labels life
stories, which are personal narratives that provide the individual with a meaningful identity regarding
where they have been, how they got to where they are, and where they are going.
1

It is important to note that liberals did not indicate that the other three foundations are never relevant. They were simply
seen as less relevant than the foundations of Harm and Fairness.
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According to Haidt and colleagues (2009), the moral foundations are not themselves individuallevel traits, but individuals vary in the extent to which they rely on each of the moral foundations to
define morality. As such, reliance on the moral foundations (as measured by the MFQ) are most likely
contained in Level 2 of McAdams’ (1995) characterization of personality and capture individual
differences that may play a role in the formation of moral conviction. For example, if an individual
considers fairness as highly important to their definition of morality (i.e., high reliance on the Fairness
moral foundation), then we would expect their attitude toward cheating on an exam (which is a clear
violation of Fairness) to be a reflection of their moral beliefs (i.e., high moral conviction). However,
most moral issues are more complicated than cheating, frequently encompassing numerous moral
considerations. Debate over the merits of embryonic stem cell research, for instance, typically draws
upon arguments regarding the ability to treat serious human illnesses, the rights of the unborn, and the
sanctity of human life. In these instances, simply knowing the extent to which an individual relies on
the moral foundations may not necessarily inform us as to whether their attitude reflects their moral
beliefs. To make such predictions we need to also consider how the individual sees the issue as related
to the various moral foundations.
For many controversial issues both sides couch their arguments in moral terms. However, the
framing of these arguments frequently relate more strongly to certain moral foundations than others. For
example, arguments for and against the legalization of gay marriage typically cite the fair and equal
administration of rights regardless of sexual orientation and the need to preserve the stability/sanctity of
the institution of marriage, respectively. As a whole, the issue of legalizing gay marriage can thus be
seen as most strongly related to the moral foundations of Fairness, Authority, and Purity. Which
foundation predicts moral conviction, however, depends on the individual. One individual may display
high moral conviction because they consider Fairness to be an important component of their moral
beliefs (i.e., high reliance on the Fairness foundation) and they believe that legalizing gay marriage is a
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matter of providing equal rights to all citizens (i.e., the issue is strongly related to the Fairness
foundation). Another individual may display an equal level of moral conviction toward gay marriage,
but this arises from their high reliance on the Purity moral foundation and their desire to preserve the
sanctity of marriage between a man and a woman (i.e., the issue is strongly related to the Purity
foundation). In other words, when reliance on a particular moral foundation is high and an issue is
thought to be strongly related to that same foundation, high moral conviction toward that issue emerges.
Study 1 was designed to test this prediction.
The Present Research
The basic prediction for the proposed research is that in order for an individual to have high
moral conviction toward a particular issue, two conditions must be met. First, the individual must place
high reliance on a particular moral foundation (e.g., Fairness). Second, the individual must perceive that
the issue in question is highly related to that same foundation (e.g., Fairness). For example, high moral
conviction toward legalizing gay marriage would be predicted only in a circumstance when an
individual considers Fairness an important component of defining right from wrong AND believes that
legalizing gay marriage is highly related to concepts of Fairness. If the individual does not place high
reliance on the Fairness foundation, perceiving the legalization of gay marriage as related to Fairness
would not lead to high moral conviction. Even if they do place high reliance on Fairness, if they do not
perceive legalizing gay marriage as related to Fairness, this also would not lead to high moral
conviction. In both these instances, the individuals may have strong attitudes toward legalizing gay
marriage, but because their reliance on the moral foundations does not match their perception of how the
issue relates to the foundations, their attitude is not a reflection of their moral beliefs. In this way the
interaction of reliance on a moral foundation and the relation of an issue to that same foundation can be
used to predict moral conviction.
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The purpose of study 1 was to examine whether moral conviction can be predicted from the
interaction of individual reliance on the moral foundations and perceived relatedness of an issue to these
same foundations. Specifically, it was predicted that increases in the match between reliance on the
moral foundations and perceived relatedness of an issue to the foundations will predict higher moral
conviction toward that same issue (Hypothesis 1). This primary hypothesis was tested for two separate
issues - legalizing gay marriage and using torture to obtain military intelligence. Specific hypotheses
can also be forwarded for each issue.
As previously stated, arguments for and against legalizing gay marriage relate most directly to
the foundations of Fairness, Authority, and Purity. It was therefore predicted that high-high matches on
the Fairness, Authority, and Purity foundations would significantly predict high moral conviction toward
legalizing gay marriage (Hypothesis 2). Arguments for and against using torture to obtain military
intelligence cite the need to protect people from inhumane treatment, universal human rights, the need to
protect one’s country, and maintaining authoritative control/order. As such, using torture to obtain
military intelligence can be seen as related to Harm, Fairness, Ingroup/Loyalty, and Authority. Highhigh matches on the Harm, Fairness, Ingroup/Loyalty, and Authority foundations were therefore
expected to significantly predict high moral conviction toward the use of torture (Hypothesis 3).
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Study 1 Methods
Study 1 examined whether moral conviction toward two separate issues (legalizing gay marriage
and using torture to obtain military intelligence) can be reliably predicted from the interaction of
individual reliance on the moral foundations (MFQ scores) and the perceived relatedness of these issues
to the moral foundations.
Participants
The final sample included data from 469 (302 female, 167 male) undergraduate students at the
University of Texas at El Paso. An online survey application – SurveyMonkey – was used to collect
data and participants received partial credit toward a course requirement in return for their participation.
Participant ages ranged from 17 to 49 with an average age of 20 years. The majority of participants were
of Hispanic ethnicity (411; 87.6%).
Materials
Participants answered items concerning attitude strength (extremity, importance, certainty), and
moral conviction (dependent measure) toward gay marriage and torture. Participants also rated the
relatedness of these issues to the moral foundations. We also gathered data regarding political
orientation, religiosity, and individual reliance on the different moral foundations (MFQ).
Attitude strength. Attitude strength is frequently measuring from attitude extremity, important,
and certainty (Petty & Krosnick, 1995). These components were measured with nine items (three items
per component) in an attitude strength scale we developed from items previously used by Skitka and
colleagues (2005). Participants completed this scale for both gay marriage and torture and indicated their
responses using a seven point scale ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree, with neutral or
neither as a center point.
Extremity. Attitude extremity was measured using the following three items: “I would oppose
legislation to legalize this issue”, “My attitude toward this issue is positive” (reverse coded), and
8

“Thinking about this issue generates negative feelings in me”. Responses were coded from – 3 to +3 and
extremity was assessed by calculating the absolute value of the deviation of responses from the scale
midpoints and adding these together2. Higher scores indicate greater attitude extremity. These items
demonstrated fair reliability (α’s = .684 and .645 for gay marriage and torture, respectively).
Importance. Attitude importance was measured using the following three items: “This issue is
not particularly important to me” (reverse coded), “I have considered taking personal action on this
issue”, and “It bothers me when people don’t take this issue seriously”. Responses are coded on a scale
from 1 to 7, with scores ranging from 3 to 21. Higher scores indicate higher importance. These items
demonstrated poor to fair reliability (α’s = .738 and .593 for gay marriage and torture, respectively).
Certainty. Attitude certainty was measured using the following three items: “I am certain of my
position on this issue”, “Persuasive arguments could do little to change my stance on this issue”, and
“Sometimes I question my stance on this issue” (reverse coded). Responses are coded on a scale from 1
to 7, with scores ranging from 3 to 21. Higher scores indicate higher certainty.
These items demonstrated somewhat poor reliability (α’s = .568 and .576 for gay marriage and torture,
respectively).
Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ). The Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ;
Graham et al., 2011) is composed of two sub-scales, each containing 15 items, for a total of 30 items (6
items per foundation; see Appendix A for full scales). Part I assesses the relevance of each moral
foundation to an individual when making moral decisions. It begins with the phrase, “When you decide
whether something is right or wrong, to what extent are the following considerations relevant to your
thinking?”, and participants respond to items (e.g., “Whether or not someone suffered emotionally”,
“Whether or not someone showed a lack of loyalty”) using a six point scale ranging from not at all
relevant to extremely relevant. Part II of the questionnaire assesses the extent to which participants

2

Attitude (valence) was also calculated by adding scores without a midfold.
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agree or disagree with various moral judgments. Participants respond to items (e.g., “Compassion for
those who are suffering is the most crucial virtue”, “Respect for authority is something all children need
to learn”) using a six point scale ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree. The foundation
subscales demonstrated fair reliabilities (α’s = .705, .681, .718, .652, and .805 for Harm, Fairness,
Ingroup, Authority, and Purity, respectively). Responses on each item are coded as ranging from 1 to 6.
Responses on all six items for each foundation are added together, thus scores on each foundation can
range from 6 to 36 with higher scores indicating greater reliance on that foundation in making
right/wrong decisions.
Issue-relatedness. This scale was designed to capture the extent to which participants perceive
an issue to be related to the five moral foundations. It begins with the statement, “Please indicate the
extent to which you think [Issue] violates or supports the following”. There are two items for each moral
foundation (e.g., “Respect for authority”, “Protecting the weak and vulnerable”) and participants
indicate their responses using a nine point scale ranging from strongly violates to strongly supports, with
neither violates or supports as a neutral center point (see Appendix for full scale). Because we are only
interested in the degree of relation and not necessarily the direction, responses on the extremes of the
issue-relatedness scale would be coded as 4’s. This is because the responses of strongly violates and
strongly supports both indicate high degrees of relation between the issue and that particular foundation.
The central point would be coded as 0, and the points moving from neutral toward the outside as 1’s,
2’s, and 3’s respectively (i.e., midfold). Using this scale, the two issues of legalizing gay marriage and
torture each received a score on each of the five moral foundations – a score for relation to Harm, a
score for relation to Fairness, etc. Each score on each foundation could range from 0 to 8, with higher
values indicating higher perceived relation between the issue and the foundation in question.
Moral conviction. Moral conviction was measured using four items nearly identical to those
used by Mullen and Skitka (2006). The only difference from the items used by Mullen and Skitka (2006)

10

was that the present items refered to a general social issue (“this issue”) rather than specifically to
abortion. Participants completed this scale for both the gay marriage and torture issues and indicated
their responses using a bipolar scale ranging from -3 (strongly disagree) to +3 (strongly agree), with 0
(neutral or neither) serving as a center point. The four items were: (a) “My attitude about this issue is
closely related to my core moral values and convictions”, (b) “My attitude about this issue is closely tied
to how I see myself as a person”, (c) “I would feel really awful about myself if I did not defend my
position on this issue”, (d) “My feelings about this issue are related to how important it is to demonstrate
to myself or others that I will stand up for what I think is right”. Responses were coded on a scale from 1
to 7, with scores ranging from 4 to 28. Higher scores indicate higher moral conviction.Reliabilities on
this scale were acceptable (α’s = .793 and .833 for gay marriage and torture, respectively).
Political orientation. Political orientation was measured with a single item asking participants
to use a seven point scale ranging from strongly liberal to strongly conservative, with moderate as a
neutral center point.
Religiosity. Religiosity was measured with four items (see Appendix A for full scale) taken from
Joseph and Diduca’s (2007) Dimensions of Religiosity Scale (e.g., I think about God all the time, God
does not help me to make decisions). Responses are made on a five point scale ranging from strongly
disagree to strongly agree and aggregated to form a measure of religiosity. Scores could range from 4
to 20, with higher scores indicating higher religiosity. This scale demonstrated fair reliability (α = .70).
Procedure
After a participant signed up for the experiment they gained access to a link that connected them
with the online informed consent. Participants first read the informed consent form, and if they agreed
to participate, they were provided with a web address to access the actual survey. The survey began by
asking participants to indicate their moral conviction toward legalizing gay marriage and using torture to
obtain military intelligence. This was followed by the attitude strength and issue-relatedness scales.
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Next participants filled out the MFQ, followed by their gender, age, education level, ethnicity, and race.
Last they completed the items measuring religiosity and were asked to indicate their political
orientation.
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Study 1 Results
Data Preparation
Missing data was imputed using the EM logarithm single imputation method in PRELIS (0.58%
missingness). Match variables were created by multiplying each MFQ foundation variable by its
corresponding issue-relatedness variable. For example, participants’ scores on Harm-MFQ were
multiplied with scores on Harm-Issue, scores on Fair-MFQ multiplied with Fair-Issue, etc. This was
done for each issue (legalizing gay marriage and using torture to obtain military intelligence) to create a
total of ten match variables (five per issue) representing the interactions between personal reliance on
the moral foundations and perceived relation of the issue to the moral foundations. Variables were
mean-centered to aid interpretation of the interaction terms in the hierarchical regression analyses.
Descriptives
Legalizing gay marriage. Scores on moral conviction toward legalizing gay marriage ranged
from 4 to 28 with a mean of 18.73 (SE = .253). Scores on attitude extremity ranged from 0 to 9 with a
mean of 5.10 (SE = .118), scores on attitude importance ranged from 3 to 21 with a mean of 11.93 (SE =
.193), and scores on attitude certainty ranged from 5 to 21 with a mean of 15.77 (SE = .161). Moral
conviction and the three attitude strength dimensions were all significantly intercorrelated (see Table 1).

Table 1: Correlations among moral conviction and attitude strength dimensions for the issue of
legalizing gay marriage.
Moral
Conviction

Attitude
Extremity

Moral
1.0
Conviction
Attitude
.288*
1.0
Extremity
Attitude
.489*
.402*
Importance
Attitude
.349*
.474*
Certainty
* correlation significant at the p = .01 level.
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Attitude
Importance

Attitude
Certainty

1.0
.374*

1.0

Using torture to obtain military intelligence. Scores on moral conviction toward using torture
ranged from 4 to 28 with a mean of 18.52 (SE = .264). Scores on attitude extremity ranged from 0 to 9
with a mean of 4.15 (SE = .123), scores on attitude importance ranged from 3 to 21 with a mean of 12.14
(SE = .151), and scores on attitude certainty ranged from 5 to 21 with a mean of 13.87 (SE = .162).
Moral conviction and the three attitude strength dimensions were all significantly intercorrelated (see
Table 2).

Table 2: Correlations among moral conviction and attitude strength dimensions for the issue of using
torture to obtain military intelligence.
Moral
Conviction

Attitude
Extremity

Moral
1.0
Conviction
Attitude
.204*
1.0
Extremity
Attitude
.384*
.290*
Importance
Attitude
.258*
.442*
Certainty
* correlation significant at the p = .01 level.

Attitude
Importance

Attitude
Certainty

1.0
.381*

1.0

Analysis
Two separate hierarchical regression analyses (one for each moral issue) were performed to test
whether the moral foundations, relation of the moral issues to the five moral foundations, and the
interactions between these variables explain unique variance in moral conviction. For each analysis,
block 1 contained age, gender, political orientation, and religiosity. Block 2 contained the five MFQ
foundation variables (e.g., Harm-MFQ, Fair-MFQ). The five issue-relatedness variables (e.g., HarmIssue, Fair-Issue) were entered in block 3. Finally, the MFQ-issue relatedness match variables
(heretofore referred to as match variables) were entered in block 4.
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Legalizing gay marriage. As can be seen in Table 3, the variables in block 1 account for a
significant amount of variance in moral conviction toward legalizing gay marriage, R2 = .051, F (4, 462)
= 6.19, p < .001. Block 2, which included the foundation scores from the MFQ, explained a significant
amount of unique variance in moral conviction toward legalizing gay marriage, ∆R2 = .067, F∆ (5, 457)
= 6.91, p < .001. The addition of the five issue-relatedness variables in block 3 also captured a
significant amount of unique variance, ∆R2 = .051, F∆ (5, 452) = 5.58, p < .001. The last block,
containing the five match variables, did not significantly increase the amount of unique variance
explained, ∆R2 = .014, F∆ (5, 447) = 1.50, p = .1893.

Table 3: Hierarchical regression analysis testing the effect of MFQ scores, issue-relatedness scores, and
the foundation match interactions on moral conviction toward legalizing gay marriage
(DV), holding gender, age, political orientation, and religiosity constant. Coefficients are
from the final model.
Variable

B

SE

p

Gender

1.069

.547

.051

Age
Political
Orientation
Religiosity

-.004

.058

.950

.046

.194

.814

.049

.055

.377

MFQ – Harm

.138

.081

.090

MFQ – Fair
MFQ – Ingrp
MFQ – Auth

.157
-.012
-.169

.087
.066
.074

.073
.859
.023

MFQ – Pure

.082

.064

.201

Issue – Harm
Issue – Fair
Issue – Ingrp

.068
.339
.347

.123
.121
.132

.579
.005
.009

Block 1: R2 = .051, F (4, 462) = 6.19, p < .001

Block 2: ∆R2 = .067, F∆ (5, 457) = 6.91, p < .001

Block 3: ∆R2 = .051, F∆ (5, 452) = 5.58, p < .001

3

The block containing the five match interaction variables was also nonsignificant when only Fairness, Authority, and Purity
variables were included in the analysis (∆R2 = .003, F∆ (3, 453) = .516, p = .617), as well as when only Fairness and Purity
variables were included (∆R2 = .002, F∆ (2, 456) = .514, p = .598).
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Issue – Auth

-.190

.137

.167

Issue – Pure

.034

.119

.775

Match – Harm
Match – Fair
Match – Ingrp

.014
.014
-.050

.021
.023
.020

.517
.539
.011

Match – Auth
Match - Pure

.037
-.016

.029
.025

.197
.527

2

Block 4: ∆R = .014, F∆ (1, 445) = 1.50, p = .189

For the overall model, moral conviction was significantly predicted by reliance on the Authority
foundation (B = -.169, SE = .074, p = .023); increasing reliance on the Authority foundation was
associated with decreases in moral conviction. Perceiving the issue as increasingly related to Fairness
(B = .339, SE = .121, p = .005) and Ingroup loyalty (B = .347, SE = .132, p = .009) was associated with
increases in moral conviction. Moral conviction was marginally predicted by reliance on the Harm (B =
.138, SE = .081, p = .09) and Fairness (B = .157, SE = .087, p = .073) moral foundations, with increasing
reliance on these foundations associated with increasing moral conviction. Thus while several of the
MFQ and issue-relatedness scores significantly predicted moral conviction toward legalizing gay
marriage, the match (i.e., interaction) of these variables did not predict moral conviction. Hypotheses 1
and 2 were therefore not supported for the issue of legalizing gay marriage.
Using torture to obtain military intelligence. The variables in block 1 explained a significant
amount of variance in moral conviction regarding the use of torture to obtain military intelligence, R2 =
.023, F (4, 462) = 2.74, p = .028. The MFQ foundation scores in block 2 captured a significant amount
of unique variance in moral conviction, ∆R2 = .049, F∆ (5, 457) = 4.87, p < .001, as did the five issuerelatedness variables in block 3, ∆R2 = .026, F∆ (5, 452) = 2.63, p = .023. As with legalizing gay
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marriage, adding the match variables in block 4 did not explain unique variance in moral conviction,
∆R2 = .012, F∆ (5, 447) = 1.15, p = .334.

Table 4: Hierarchical regression analysis testing the effect of MFQ scores, issue-relatedness scores, and
the foundation match interactions on moral conviction toward using torture to obtain
military intelligence (DV), holding gender, age, political orientation, and religiosity
constant. Coefficients are from the final model.
Variable

B

SE

p

Gender
Age
Political
Orientation
Religiosity

.131
.043

.594
.062

.825
.489

.331

.207

.110

.003

.060

.960

MFQ – Harm
MFQ – Fair

.185
.008

.089
.092

.039
.934

MFQ – Ingrp
MFQ – Auth

-.047
.061

.072
.081

.512
.449

MFQ – Pure

.063

.065

.335

Issue – Harm

.043

.165

.795

Issue – Fair
Issue – Ingrp

.167
.067

.175
.122

.339
.585

Issue – Auth
Issue – Pure

.022
.149

.138
.138

.876
.278

Match – Harm
Match – Fair
Match – Ingrp

.025
-.003
-.021

.028
.030
.021

.378
.928
.305

Match – Auth
Match - Pure

-.011
.026

.023
.017

.641
.127

2

Block 1: R = .023, F (4, 462) = 2.74, p = .028

2

Block 2: ∆R = .049, F∆ (5, 457) = 4.87, p < .001

2

Block 3: ∆R = .026, F∆ (5, 452) = 2.63, p = .023

Block 4: ∆R2 = .012, F∆ (1, 445) = 1.15, p = .330

4

The block containing the five match interaction variables was also nonsignificant when only Harm, Fairness, Ingroup, and
Authority variables were included in the analysis (∆R2 = .007, F∆ (4, 450) = .843, p = .498), as well as when only Harm and
Authority variables were included (∆R2 = .005, F∆ (2, 456) = 1.145, p = .319).
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In the overall model, only reliance on the Harm foundation significantly predicted moral
conviction, with higher reliance on this foundation associated with increasing moral conviction (B =
.185, SE = .089, p = .039). Thus across both moral issues, individual scores on the MFQ significantly
predicted moral conviction, but the hypothesis that the match (i.e., interaction) between reliance on the
foundations and perceived relation of the issue to the foundations would predict moral conviction was
not supported. Hypotheses 1 and 3 were therefore not supported for the issue of using torture.
Moral Conviction and Attitude Strength
In previous research, the influence of moral conviction on various outcomes (e.g., preferred
social distance) has been examined while controlling for the effects of attitude strength (e.g., Skitka et
al., 2005). Skitka and her colleagues interpret the finding that moral conviction explains unique
variance in these outcomes after controlling for attitude strength as evidence that moral mandates (moral
attitudes) are qualitatively different from nonmoral attitudes (Skitka et al., 2005). The source of this
qualitative difference, they argue, is the presence of moral conviction. But moral conviction itself
correlates with indices of attitude strength, both in previous research (see Skitka, 2010) and the present
(see Tables 1 & 2). Thus the qualitative difference between moral mandates and nonmoral attitudes lies
in the part of moral conviction that is independent of attitude strength. Antecedents to moral conviction
that wish to capture this unique variance, then, must do so when the effects of attitude strength are held
constant.
While moral conviction was not predicted by the hypothesized interactions, it was significantly
predicted by individual MFQ scores on the moral foundations (for both legalizing gay marriage and
using torture to obtain military intelligence) and by individual perceptions of how the issue relates to the
moral foundations (for legalizing gay marriage). To more stringently test whether these variables are
antecedents to moral conviction the effects of attitude strength must be held constant. The preceding
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analyses were therefore repeated with indices of attitude strength (attitude extremity, attitude
importance, and attitude certainty) entered into block 2 of the hierarchical regression analysis.
Legalizing gay marriage. As would be expected, block 2 (containing the attitude strength
indices) explained a significant amount of unique variance in moral conviction, ∆R2 = .238, F∆ (5, 459)
= 51.34, p < .001. In the original analysis, the MFQ variables captured a significant amount of unique
variance. In the present analysis, adding the five moral foundation variables from the MFQ in block 3
continued to capture unique variance in moral conviction above that accounted for by attitude strength,
∆R2 = .030, F∆ (5, 454) = 3.94, p = .002. Unlike before, the addition of the five issue-relatedness
variables in block 4 did not significantly increase the amount of unique variance explained, ∆R2 = .011,
F∆ (5, 449) = 1.53, p = .177. The match variables in block 5 still accounted for a negligible amount of
unique variance, ∆R2 = .006, F∆ (5, 444) = .797, p = .552. With the addition of the attitude strength
dimensions in block 2, the issue relatedness variables in block 4 no longer explained a significant
amount of unique variance in moral conviction.
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Table 5: Hierarchical regression analysis testing the effect of MFQ scores, issue-relatedness scores, and
the foundation match interactions on moral conviction toward legalizing gay marriage
(DV), holding gender, age, political orientation, religiosity, and attitude strength
(extremity, importance, certainty) constant. Coefficients are from the final model.
Variable

B

SE

p

Gender

.377

.501

.452

Age
Political
Orientation
Religiosity

-.010

.052

.850

.175

.176

.320

.060

.050

.229

Attd Extremity

-.006

.106

.958

Attd Importance
Attd Certainty

.447
.282

.061
.072

< .001
< .001

MFQ – Harm
MFQ – Fair

.143
.058

.074
.080

.053
.465

MFQ – Ingrp
MFQ – Auth
MFQ – Pure

-.012
-.113
.072

.060
.068
.058

.841
.097
.217

Issue – Harm

.038

.111

.734

Issue – Fair
Issue – Ingrp
Issue – Auth

.171
.195
-.089

.113
.121
.124

.131
.107
.472

Issue – Pure

-.029

.108

.792

Match – Harm

.019

.019

.329

Match – Fair
Match – Ingrp

-.004
-.029

.021
.018

.838
.112

Match – Auth
Match - Pure

.026
-.017

.026
.023

.316
.458

Block 1: R2 = .051, F (4, 462) = 6.19, p < .001

Block 2: ∆R2 = .238, F∆ (3, 457) = 51.3, p < .001

Block 3: ∆R2 = .030, F∆ (5, 457) = 3.94, p = .002

Block 4: ∆R2 = .011, F∆ (5, 452) = 1.53, p = .177

2

Block 5: ∆R = .006, F∆ (5, 445) = .797, p = .552

In the final model, three variables significantly predicted moral conviction – attitude importance
(B = .447, SE = .061, p < .001), attitude certainty (B = .282, SE = .072, p < .001), and reliance on the
20

Harm foundation (B = .143, SE = .074, p = .053). For all three variables, increasing scores were
associated with increasing moral conviction. Having controlled for the effect of attitude strength,
reliance on the Authority foundation and perceiving the issue as related to Fairness and Ingroup loyalty
were no longer predictive of moral conviction.
The preceding analysis was repeated, including only those moral foundation variables that were
part of the original predictions of Hypothesis 2 (Fairness, Authority, and Purity). Block 5 was also
nonsignificant when only Fairness, Authority, and Purity variables were included in the analysis (∆R2 =
.001, F∆ (3, 450) = .328, p = .805), as well as when only Fairness and Purity variables were included
(∆R2 = .000, F∆ (2, 453) = .127, p = .881). In examining the frequency distribution of moral conviction
scores for this issue, the presence of a bimodal distribution was noted, with a jump in the frequency of
scores near the high end of the moral conviction scale. The preceding analysis was once again
conducted, in an exploratory fashion, in which only data from participants classified as “high” in moral
conviction (i.e., scores of 24 or higher on the scale) was examined. Block 5 was also nonsignificant for
this analysis, ∆R2 = .026, F∆ (5, 78) = .616, p = .688. When participants were classified into two moral
conviction groups (high vs. low) and a logistic regression was performed, the match interaction variables
did not significantly improve model fit, -2LL = 369.41, χ2(5) = 8.55, p = .129.
Using torture to obtain military intelligence. Similar to the issue of legalizing gay marriage,
the attitude strength indices in block 2 captured a significant amount of unique variance in moral
conviction, ∆R2 = .154, F∆ (3, 459) = 28.53, p < .001. The five MFQ foundation variables added in
block 3 explained an additional amount of unique variance in moral conviction, ∆R2 = .024, F∆ (5, 454)
= 2.68, p = .021. The addition of the five issue-relatedness variables in block 4 did not significantly
increase the amount of unique variance explained, ∆R2 = .009, F∆ (5, 449) = 1.00, p = .417, nor did
adding the match variables in block 5, ∆R2 = .007, F∆ (5, 444) = .745, p = .590. Thus the issue
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relatedness variables in block 4 no longer explained a significant amount of unique variance in moral
conviction when attitude strength was held constant.

Table 6: Hierarchical regression analysis testing the effect of MFQ scores, issue-relatedness scores, and
the foundation match interactions on moral conviction toward using torture to obtain
military intelligence (DV), holding gender, age, political orientation, religiosity, and
attitude strength (extremity, importance, certainty) constant. Coefficients are from the final
model.
Variable

B

SE

p

Gender
Age
Political
Orientation
Religiosity

.004
.009

.561
.059

.994
.872

.381

.195

.051

.000

.056

.994

Attd Extremity
Attd Importance

.023
.514

.113
.084

.835
< .001

Attd Certainty

.169

.082

.038

MFQ – Harm

.168

.084

.048

MFQ – Fair
MFQ – Ingrp

-.050
-.037

.088
.068

.571
.586

MFQ – Auth
MFQ – Pure

.124
-.018

.077
.063

.107
.775

Issue – Harm
Issue – Fair
Issue – Ingrp

.036
.165
-.015

.158
.165
.116

.819
.319
.899

Issue – Auth
Issue – Pure

-.031
.098

.130
.130

.811
.453

Match – Harm
Match – Fair

.016
-.010

.027
.028

.546
.727

Match – Ingrp
Match – Auth

-.018
.001

.019
.022

.343
.969

Match - Pure

.023

.016

.161

Block 1: R2 = .023, F (4, 462) = 2.74, p = .028

Block 2: ∆R2 = .154, F∆ (3, 457) = 28.5, p < .001

Block 3: ∆R2 = .024, F∆ (5, 457) = 2.68, p = .021

Block 4: ∆R2 = .009, F∆ (5, 452) = 1.00, p = .417

Block 5: ∆R2 = .007, F∆ (5, 445) = .745, p = .590
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Mirroring results from legalizing gay marriage, three variables significantly predicted moral
conviction in the final model – attitude importance (B = .514, SE = .084, p < .001), attitude certainty (B
= .169, SE = .082, p = .038), and reliance on the Harm foundation (B = .168, SE = .084, p = .048). As
before, increases on these variables predicted increasing moral conviction. Thus it appears that only
MFQ scores on the Harm foundation significantly predict moral conviction when the effects of attitude
strength are held constant. Moreover, moral conviction is significantly and consistently predicted by
both attitude importance and attitude certainty.
The preceding analysis was repeated, including only those moral foundation variables that were
part of the original predictions of Hypothesis 3 (Harm, Fairness, Ingroup loyalty, and Authority). Block
5 was also nonsignificant when only these variables were included in the analysis (∆R2 = .003, F∆ (4,
447) = .413, p = .799), as well as when only Harm and Authority variables were included (∆R2 = .002,
F∆ (2, 453) = .446, p = .641). A bimodal distribution was also noted for moral conviction toward using
torture, thus the preceding analysis was repeated only on data from participants classified as “high” in
moral conviction (i.e., scores of 24 or higher on the scale). Block 5 was nonsignificant for this analysis,
∆R2 = .055, F∆ (5, 82) = 1.41, p = .230. As with legalizing gay marriage, participants were classified
into two moral conviction groups (high vs. low) and a logistic regression was performed; the match
interaction variables again did not significantly improve model fit, -2LL = 400.25, χ2(5) = 6.06, p = .300.
Exploratory Analyses
The preceding analyses revealed that both attitude importance and attitude certainty are
consistent, strong predictors of moral conviction whereas only reliance on the Harm foundation
consistently predicted moral conviction. Recent research has found that reliance on the five moral
foundations (as measured by the MFQ) can be used to predict attitudes toward various controversial
issues, including same-sex marriage and using torture (Koleva, Graham, Iyer, Ditto, & Haidt, 2012).
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Thus it is possible that scores on the MFQ in the present study also predict attitude strength regarding
these issues. If so, then a more accurate representation of the relationships among these variables may
be that reliance on the five moral foundations (MFQ scores) predicts attitude strength, and attitude
strength then predicts moral conviction. An illustration of these relationships is provided in Figure 1.

MFQ Harm
Attitude
Extremity
MFQ Fair

Attitude
Importance

MFQ
Ingroup

Moral
Conviction

MFQ
Authority
Attitude
Certainty

MFQ
Purity

Figure 1: Proposed measured variable path analysis model in which reliance on the five moral
foundations (MFQ scores) predict dimensions of attitude strength, which then predict moral
conviction. A direct path from reliance on the Harm foundation to moral conviction was
included given the significance of this predictor in preceding analyses (but see footnotes 3
and 4).
A measured variable path model was constructed to represent the hypothesized relationships,
which included the following variables: reliance on the Harm foundation (MFQ Harm), reliance on the
Fairness foundation (MFQ Fair), reliance on the Ingroup loyalty foundation (MFQ Ingroup), reliance on
the Authority foundation (MFQ Authority), reliance on the Purity foundation (MFQ Purity), attitude
extremity, attitude important, attitude certainty, and moral conviction.
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An asymptotic variance-covariance matrix was created in PRELIS 2.20, which was required for
further analyses due to significant violations of normality (Gay marriage: Skew = 5.59, Kurtosis =
106.9; Using torture: Skew = 6.47, Kurtosis = 109.23). The proposed relationships were estimated with
a measured variable path analysis, one analysis per moral issue. The models were analyzed in LISREL
8.80 software (Jöreskog & Sörbom, 2006) using the maximum likelihood estimation method. Following
Hu and Bentler’s (1999) recommendations, model fit was assessed using a combination of fit indices –
Satorra-Bentler Scaled chi-square, normed fit index (NFI), root mean square error of approximation
(RMSEA), comparative fit index (CFI), and standardized root mean square residual (SRMR). Good
model fit is indicated when p > .05 for the Satorra-Bentler chi-square, NFI is greater than 0.95, RMSEA
is less than 0.06, CFI is greater than 0.90, and SRMR is less than 0.08.
Legalizing gay marriage. According to the above fit standards, the model is an excellent fit to
the observed data, Satorra-Bentler χ2(14) = 3.00, p = 1.00, NFI = 1.00, RMSEA = 0.0 (90% CI: 0.0 ;
0.0), CFI = 1.0, SRMR = .00635. Moreover, the modeled relationships among variables accounted for
8% of the observed variance in attitude extremity, 8% of the observed variance in attitude importance,
5% of the observed variance in attitude certainty, and 31% of the observed variance in moral conviction.
Higher reliance on the Harm foundation significantly predicted increased attitude extremity (B =
.09, SE = .04, p < .05), increased attitude importance (B = .14, SE = .06, p < .05), and increased moral
conviction (B = .23, SE = .05, p < .05). Higher reliance on the Fairness foundation significantly
predicted increased attitude extremity (B = .09, SE = .04, p < .05), increased attitude importance (B =
.17, SE = .06, p < .05), and increased attitude certainty (B = .19, SE = .05, p < .05). Higher reliance on
the Purity foundation significantly predicted decreased attitude extremity (B = -.11, SE = .03, p < .05).

5 A competing nested model was run in which the direct path from the MFQ Harm variable to moral conviction was omitted.
This model was also a good fit to the observed data, Satorra-Bentler χ2(15) = 23.81, p = .068, NFI = .99, RMSEA = 0.036
(90% CI: 0.0 ; 0.061), CFI = .99, SRMR = .040. However, when this model was compared to the presented model, the fit
was significantly worse than the fit of the model containing the direct path from MFQ Harm to moral conviction, ∆RMSEA =
.036, Satorra-Bentler χ2 scaled difference = 19.66, p < .001.
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Higher moral conviction was also significantly predicted by increasing attitude importance (B = .49, SE
= .07, p < .05) and increasing attitude certainty (B = .30, SE = .08, p < .05).

MFQ Harm
Attitude
Extremity
MFQ Fair

Attitude
Importance

MFQ
Ingroup

Moral
Conviction

MFQ
Authority
Attitude
Certainty

MFQ
Purity

Figure 2: Results for measured variable path analysis on gay marriage data. Significant pathways are
in bold while nonsignificant pathways are dashed. Satorra-Bentler χ2 = 3.00, p = 1.0; NFI
= 1.0; RMSEA = 0.0; CFI = 1.0; SRMR = .0063; degrees of freedom = 14.
Given the significant relationships between reliance on the moral foundations and the attitude
strength dimensions for this issue, it is possible that reliance on the moral foundations indirectly affects
moral conviction through attitude strength. In other words, the attitude strength dimensions may be
mediators between reliance on the moral foundations and moral conviction toward legalizing gay
marriage. In particular, it is plausible that attitude importance and attitude certainty mediate the effects
of reliance on Harm and Fairness on moral conviction. The significance of these indirect pathways were
testing using Andrew Hayes’ PROCESS modeling tool (Hayes, 2012) in SPSS, which generates both a
point estimate and 95% bias-corrected bootstrap confidence interval for indirect effects. For each
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analysis, 5000 bootstrap samples were requested and all variables not directly involved in the mediation
were included as covariates to control for their influence. For example, when examining whether
attitude importance mediates the relationship between MFQ Harm and moral conviction, MFQ Fair,
MFQ Ingroup, MFQ Authority, MFQ Purity, attitude extremity, and attitude certainty were all included
as covariates in the analysis.
The mediation analyses indicate that the relationship between reliance on the Harm foundation
(MFQ Harm) and moral conviction is significantly mediated by attitude importance (a1b1 = .0523,
BootSE = .0274, 95% bias-corrected bootstrap confidence interval = .0031 ; .1114). Increasing reliance
on the Harm foundation was associated with increasing attitude importance (a1 = .1091, SE = .0555, p =
.049), and increasing attitude importance was associated with increasing moral conviction (b1 = .4794,
SE = .058, p < .0001). The relationship between reliance on the Fairness foundation (MFQ Fair) and
moral conviction was significantly mediated by attitude certainty (a1b1 = .0325, BootSE = .0163, 95%
bias-corrected bootstrap confidence interval = .0079 ; .0757). Increasing reliance on the Fairness
foundation was associated with increasing attitude certainty (a1 = .1133, SE = .049, p = .021) and
increasing attitude certainty was associated with increasing moral conviction (b1 = .2868, SE = .0715, p
= .0001). No other indirect paths were significant. Thus increasing reliance on the Harm foundation is
both directly and indirectly (through attitude importance) associated with increasing moral conviction
toward legalizing gay marriage, and the effect of reliance on the Fairness foundation on moral
conviction is mediated through attitude certainty.
Using torture to obtain military intelligence. The above measured variable path analysis was
repeated for the issue of using torture to obtain military intelligence. The proposed model was also an
excellent fit to the observed data for this issue, Satorra-Bentler χ2(14) = 4.59, p = .99, NFI = 1.00,
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RMSEA = 0.0 (90% CI: 0.0 ; 0.0), CFI = 1.0, SRMR = .0136. The modeled relationships among
variables accounted for 5% of the observed variance in attitude extremity, 8% of the observed variance
in attitude importance, 3% of the observed variance in attitude certainty, and 19% of the observed
variance in moral conviction.
Increasing reliance on the Harm foundation was significantly associated with increasing attitude
extremity (B = .10, SE = .04, p < .05) as well as increasing moral conviction (B = .18, SE = .05, p < .05).
Increasing reliance on the Purity foundation was significantly associated with increasing attitude
extremity (B = .12, SE = .03, p < .05) and increasing attitude certainty (B = .10, SE = .04, p < .05). As
with legalizing gay marriage, higher moral conviction was significantly predicted by increasing attitude
importance (B = .51, SE = .09, p < .05) and attitude certainty (B = .18, SE = .08, p < .05).

6

As with legalizing gay marriage, a competing nested model was also run in which the direct path from the MFQ Harm
variable to moral conviction was omitted. This model was a good fit to the observed data, Satorra-Bentler χ2(15) = 15.32, p =
.43, NFI = .99, RMSEA = 0.0068 (90% CI: 0.0 ; 0.045), CFI = 1.00, SRMR = .035. However, when this model was
compared to the presented model, the fit was significantly worse than the fit of the model containing the direct path from
MFQ Harm to moral conviction, Satorra-Bentler χ2 scaled difference = 13.28, p < .001.
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Figure 3: Results for measured variable path analysis on using torture to obtain military intelligence.
Significant pathways are in bold while nonsignificant pathways are dashed. SatorraBentler χ2 = 4.59, p = .99; NFI = 1.0; RMSEA = 0.0; CFI = 1.0; SRMR = .013; degrees of
freedom = 14.
Mediation analyses were performed to examine whether attitude strength mediates the
relationship between reliance on the moral foundations and moral conviction toward the use of torture.
As before, 5000 bootstrap samples were requested for each analysis and all variables not directly
involved in the mediation were included as covariates to control for their influence. Only one indirect
effect reached significance. Attitude importance significantly mediated the relationship between
reliance on the purity foundation and moral conviction (a1b1 = .0435, BootSE = .0183, 95% biascorrected bootstrap confidence interval = .0130 ; .0863); increasing reliance on the Purity foundation
was associated with increasing attitude importance (a1 = .0837, SE = .0323, p = .0098), and increasing
attitude importance was associated with increasing moral conviction (b1 = .5195, SE = .083, p < .0001).
No other indirect paths were significant. For the issue of using torture to obtain military intelligence,
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then, higher reliance on the Harm moral foundation directly predicts increasing moral conviction and
higher reliance on the Purity foundation indirectly predicts increasing moral conviction through
increased attitude importance.
Both issues. A final path analysis was conducted in which the attitude strength and moral
conviction variables from both issues (legalizing gay marriage and using torture) were all included in the
same model. Thus reliance on the five moral foundations predicted attitude extremity toward gay
marriage and using torture, attitude importance toward gay marriage and torture, and attitude certainty
toward gay marriage and torture. These six attitude strength variables then directly predicted moral
conviction toward gay marriage and using torture. Direct paths from reliance on the Harm foundation to
moral conviction toward gay marriage and moral conviction toward using torture were also included in
the model.
An asymptotic variance-covariance matrix was created in PRELIS 2.20, which was required for
further analyses due to significant violations of normality (Skew = 13.42, Kurtosis = 215.22). The
proposed model was an excellent fit to the observed data, Satorra-Bentler χ2(30) = 28.87, p = .52, NFI =
.99, RMSEA = 0.0 (90% CI: 0.0 ; 0.033), CFI = 1.0, SRMR = .023. The modeled relationships among
variables accounted for 9% of the observed variance in attitude extremity, 7% of the observed variance
in attitude importance, 5% of the observed variance in attitude certainty, and 31% of the observed
variance in moral conviction toward legalizing gay marriage. The modeled relationships among
variables accounted for 5% of the observed variance in attitude extremity, 9% of the observed variance
in attitude importance, 3% of the observed variance in attitude certainty, and 19% of the observed
variance in moral conviction toward using torture to obtain military intelligence.
Reliance on the Harm foundation directly predicted moral conviction toward both
legalizing gay marriage (B = .22, SE = .05) and using torture (B = .18, SE = .05). This foundation also
predicted attitude extremity (B = .09, SE = .04) and importance (B = .14, SE = .06) toward legalizing gay
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marriage, and attitude extremity (B = .10, SE = .04) toward using torture. Reliance on the Fairness
foundation significantly predicted attitude extremity (B = .09, SE = .04), importance (B = .17, SE = .06),
and certainty (B = .19, SE = .05) toward legalizing gay marriage. Reliance on the Purity foundation
significantly predicted attitude extremity (B = -.11, SE = .03) toward gay marriage, and both attitude
importance (B = .12, SE = .03) and certainty (B = .10, SE = .04) toward using torture. Moral conviction
toward legalizing gay marriage was significantly predicted by attitude importance (B = .51, SE = .07)
and certainty (B = .26, SE = .07) toward gay marriage. Moral conviction toward using torture was also
significantly predicted by attitude importance (B = .50, SE = .08) and certainty (B = .20, SE = .08)
toward using torture.
While exploratory in nature, the preceding analyses indicate that reliance on the five moral
foundations predict moral conviction both directly (reliance on the Harm foundation) and indirectly.
Their indirect effect, moreover, is partly mediated through attitude importance and attitude certainty.
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Study 1 Discussion
Study 1 examined whether moral conviction toward two separate issues (legalizing gay marriage
and using torture to obtain military intelligence) can be reliably predicted from the interaction of
individual reliance on the moral foundations (MFQ scores) and the perceived relatedness of these issues
to the moral foundations. It was hypothesized that moral conviction would increase as the degree of
high-high match between individual reliance on the moral foundations and perceived relation of the
issues to these foundations increases. This prediction was not supported, but other interesting
relationships emerged. When attitude strength dimensions were included in the analysis, stronger moral
conviction was associated with increasing attitude importance, increasing attitude certainty, and
increasing reliance on the Harm moral foundation. Study 1 therefore identified three potential
antecedents of moral conviction – reliance on the Harm foundation (MFQ Harm scores), attitude
importance, and attitude certainty.
Those who relied heavily on the Harm foundation in their definition of morality reported higher
moral conviction toward both legalizing gay marriage and using torture to obtain military intelligence.
This result might be expected if participants thought both issues were particularly related to the Harm
foundation, but issue-relatedness scores do not support this explanation. Participants found the issue of
legalizing gay marriage to be most related to the Fairness foundation (M = 5.63), then Purity (M = 3.76),
and then Harm (M = 3.61). Participants also found the issue of using torture to be most related to
Fairness (M = 5.57), followed by Harm (M = 5.31). Another possible explanation is that participants in
the sample relied to a much greater extent on the Harm foundation than other foundations in their
definition of morality. This too is not supported by the data. While participants did report higher
reliance on Harm and Fairness foundations than the other foundations7, reliance on the Harm foundation

7

Higher endorsement of the Harm and Fairness moral foundations, relative to the other three, is a pattern observed among
those of moderate to liberal political orientation (Haidt, Graham, & Joseph, 2009). The present sample consisted of 41%
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(M = 28.19, SE = .220) was not significantly higher than reliance on the Fairness foundation (M = 28.10,
SE = .194), t (468) = .530, p = .596. If relatively high reliance on one of the moral foundations is
sufficient to make it predictive of moral conviction, then reliance on the Fairness foundation should also
have significantly predicted moral conviction. This was not the case. Moreover, it does not appear that
reliance on the Harm foundation is more accurately or reliably captured by the MFQ scale items than
reliance on the other moral foundations. While Cronbach’s alpha was .705 for the items measuring
reliance on Harm, two other subscales had higher reliabilities – Ingroup loyalty (α = .718) and Purity (α
= .805). If better measurement was driving the ability of reliance on a moral foundation to predict moral
conviction, these other foundations should also have been significantly predictive. Reliance on the
Harm foundation, therefore, appears to represent a unique individual difference where those high in
reliance have a greater overall tendency to base attitudes on their moral beliefs. The relationship
between the other moral foundations and moral conviction, however, was less direct.
Exploratory path and mediation analyses indicate that reliance on the moral foundations
significantly predicts attitude strength (extremity, importance, certainty) and the relationship between
the moral foundations and moral conviction may be at least partly mediated through these attitude
strength dimensions. That is, reliance on the moral foundations predicts attitude strength (extremity,
importance, certainty), which then predicts moral conviction. Across both issues, increasing reliance on
the Harm foundation directly predicted stronger moral conviction. For the issue of legalizing gay
marriage, reliance on the Harm foundation indirectly predicted moral conviction through attitude
importance, and reliance on the Fairness moral foundation indirectly predicted moral conviction through
attitude certainty. For the issue of using torture, reliance on the Purity foundation indirectly predicted
moral conviction through attitude importance.

liberal-leaning and 40% moderate participants, explaining the relatively higher reliance on the Harm and Fairness
foundations.
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One implication of these results is that reliance on the five moral foundations not only predicts
general attitudes (Koleva et al., 2012), but also significantly predicts dimensions of attitude strength.
Participants viewed the issue of legalizing gay marriage as most related to Fairness (M = 5.63), Purity
(M = 3.76), and Harm (M = 3.76) and these were the foundations that significantly predicted attitude
strength. Specifically, attitude extremity was predicted by Harm, Fairness, and Purity, attitude
importance was predicted by Harm and Fairness, and attitude certainty was predicted by Fairness.
Participants viewed the issue of using torture to obtain military intelligence as most related to Fairness
(M = 5.57), Harm (M = 5.31), and Purity (M = 4.64) as well. Attitude extremity was predicted by Harm,
and Purity predicted both attitude importance and attitude certainty. While previous research
demonstrates that negative message framing (Bizer, Larsen, & Petty, 2011), defensive self-esteem
(Haddock & Gebauer, 2011), and various personality variables (Britt, Pusilo, McKibben, Kelley, Baker,
& Nielson, 2011) influence attitude strength dimensions, the current study offers evidence that
individual reliance on the various moral foundations also predicts attitude strength.
With the exception of Harm, the relationship between reliance on the moral foundations and
moral conviction was mediated through attitude importance and attitude certainty, which both
significantly predicted moral conviction across issues.

This highlights the importance of attitude

strength in studying moral conviction. Skitka (2010) defines moral mandates as attitudes held with
moral conviction, and thus the presence of moral conviction suggests an explicit link between a person’s
attitude and their moral beliefs.

The results from study 1 were a poignant reminder that moral

conviction is intimately and inextricably tied to attitudes; two out of the three potential antecedents
identified were dimensions of attitude strength. Most research on moral conviction, however, has
focused primarily on the morality literature with minimal emphasis on the attitude literature. With this
in mind, study 2 continued the investigation for antecedents to moral conviction by drawing from the
vast literature on attitudes.
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Study 2 Introduction
Within the attitudes literature is a unique construct that bears some striking similarities to moral
conviction – value-relevance. An attitude is said to have value-relevance when a person “comes to view
the [attitude] object as relevant to his or her basic social and personal values” (Boninger, Krosnick, and
Berent, 1995). That is, when there exists an explicit link between the attitude and personal values.
Importantly, value-relevance has been measured with items that bear remarkable similarities to those
used to measure moral conviction. For example, moral conviction has been measured by asking
participants, “to what extent their position on a particular issue is a reflection of their core moral beliefs
and convictions” or asking their level of agreement with statements such as, “my attitude about this
issue is closely related to my core moral values and convictions”. For comparison, Boninger and
colleagues (1995) measured value-relevance by asking participants “how much their opinions on the
issue were related to their personal values, how often they considered that their attitudes on the issue
were related to their values, and how much their attitudes were based on their values” (p. 73). In a more
recent study, value-relevance was measured by asking participants to indicate “the degree to which their
views on the issue of abortion were closely related to their core values…how frequently the issue of
legalized abortion brought to mind important values, the extent to which their attitudes toward abortion
were based on their basic values, and the degree to which their opinions on the issue were an expression
of their core values” [italics in original] (Holbrook, Berent, Krosnick, Visser, & Boninger, 2005, p. 764).
Core values were defined as personal beliefs about right and wrong, beliefs about good and bad ways of
living, and religious beliefs. While not all values are moral in nature (e.g., achievement), some values
are strongly tied to morality (e.g., benevolence) and the definition of “core values” in Holbrook and
colleagues’ (2005) research clearly implies that participants were responding to the term values with
morality in mind. This, combined with the uncanny similarities between these items and those used to
measure moral conviction, suggests that value-relevance and moral conviction are very similar
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constructs. If so, then any discovered antecedents to value-relevance may also be antecedents to moral
conviction.
Moral Conviction and Personal Relevance
The vast majority of research on value-relevance has used this construct to predict attitudes and
persuasion outcomes, with little interest in how value-relevance forms in the first place. A single
exception comes from research performed by Boninger and colleagues (1995). While the primary focus
of this research was to examine factors that affect attitude importance, it was also found that personal
relevance can causally affect value-relevance (Boninger et al., 1995, study 5). In this study, personal
relevance was defined as the involvement of one’s personal rights, privileges, or lifestyle and increasing
personal relevance had the effect of also increasing value-relevance. Applying these results to the
current study, if value-relevance and moral conviction are similar constructs, then increasing personal
relevance may also increase moral conviction. Study 2 experimentally manipulated personal relevance
to examine whether this variable causally influences moral conviction, thus qualifying as a potential
antecedent to moral conviction. It was specifically predicted that participants in a high personal
relevance condition would exhibit higher moral conviction than those in a low personal relevance
condition (Hypothesis 1). The possibility that personal relevance impacts moral conviction, however,
challenges the theoretical argument that moral convictions are experienced as universally true (i.e., the
universality hypothesis).
According to the universality hypothesis of the Integrated Theory of Moral Conviction (ITMC),
those who hold an attitude with moral conviction perceive that their moral standards apply to all people
in every culture (Skitka, 2010; Skitka et al., 2008). Thus the ITMC would likely predict that personal
relevance has no significant impact on moral conviction – whether one is personally involved or not, the
standard applies. Hypothesis 1 therefore serves two purposes – to examine whether personal relevance
is an antecedent to moral conviction and to test the validity of the ITMC’s universality hypothesis.

36

Beyond personal relevance, other potential antecedents to moral conviction can be identified in the
attitude literature.
Moral Conviction and Attitude Strength Dimensions
There are nearly a dozen different dimensions of attitude strength that are commonly grouped
into four different categories – features of the attitude itself (e.g., extremity and latitudes), elements of
attitude structure (e.g., accessibility, attitude knowledge), processes by which the attitude is formed
(e.g., direct experience), and people’s subjective beliefs about their attitudes (e.g., certainty, intensity)
(Krosnick, Boninger, Chuang, Berent, & Carnot, 1993). Of particular interest are the dimensions in the
last category –certainty and intensity – which may be antecedents to moral conviction and also relate to
specific hypotheses of the Integrated Theory of Moral Conviction (ITMC).
Study 1 revealed a relationship between moral conviction and attitude certainty, with higher
attitude certainty predicting higher moral conviction. It has been argued that attitude certainty is
actually composed of two distinct constructs – attitude clarity (the sense that you know your true stance
on a topic) and attitude correctness (confidence that your attitude is correct, valid, or justified)
(Petrocelli, Tormala, & Rucker, 2007). According to the objectivity hypothesis of the ITMC, those with
high moral conviction experience their moral beliefs as objective, self-justifying facts about the world
(Skitka, 2010). There would therefore be a clear, right or wrong belief and/or attitude on that particular
topic or issue. In support of this prediction, moral attitudes/beliefs have been found to rival scientific
facts with regard to perceived objectivity (Goodwin & Darley, 2008). Based on the predictions of the
ITMC and findings from Goodwin & Darley (2008), it is reasonable to expect that moral conviction will
be strongly related to attitude correctness, with higher attitude correctness predicting higher moral
conviction (Hypothesis 2). Hypothesis 2 therefore examines whether attitude correctness is a potential
antecedent to moral conviction and also tests the ITMC’s objectivity hypothesis.
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Another dimension of attitude strength is attitude intensity, defined as “the strength of the
emotional reaction provoked by the attitude object in an individual” (Krosnick et al., 1993, p. 1132).
Early research on moral psychology adopted a rationalist approach, claiming that we reach moral
judgments and knowledge via reasoning and reflection (e.g., Kohlberg, 1969; Turiel, 1983). More
recent theorizing, however, asserts that emotions play prominent roles in moral judgment (Greene,
Nystrom, Engell, Darley, & Cohen, 2004; Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2001;
Haidt, 2001; 2003).
Building upon this development in the literature, the emotion hypothesis of the Integrated Theory
of Moral Conviction (ITMC; Skitka et al., 2008) argues that moral mandates are associated with
stronger emotions than nonmoral attitudes. There is evidence to support this. Skitka and Mullen (2006)
found that challenging a person’s moral convictions elicits strong anger, which then predicts perceived
injustice. Additionally, both positive and negative emotions are strongly connected with moral
conviction toward the Iraq war and physician assisted suicide (PAS), with emotions partially mediating
the impact of moral conviction on activist intentions for PAS (Skitka & Wisneski, 2011). Thus it
appears that emotions strongly influence moral (fairness) judgments and behavioral intentions when
attitudes reflect one’s moral beliefs (high moral conviction). But it has also been proposed that emotion
plays a role in the initial moralization of issues (see Horberg, Oveis, & Keltner, 2011; Rozin, 1999) and
induced disgust has led some participants to condemn the seemingly innocuous behavior of others as
morally wrong (Wheatley & Haidt, 2005). This suggests that moral conviction may also be predicted by
the strength of one’s emotional reaction to a situation or experience. This emotional reaction can be
measured via attitude intensity. It is hypothesized that attitude intensity will predict moral conviction,
with higher attitude intensity predicting higher moral conviction (Hypothesis 3), testing both whether
attitude intensity may be a potential antecedent to moral conviction and the validity of the ITMC’s
emotion hypothesis.
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Altogether then, Hypotheses 1, 2 and 3 identify three potential antecedents to moral conviction –
personal relevance, attitude correctness, and attitude intensity – while testing three separate hypotheses
forwarded by the ITMC – universality, objectivity, and emotion. Of the three hypotheses, the
universality hypothesis has received the most research attention.
Moral Conviction and Universality
Skitka and colleagues (2005) demonstrated support for the universality hypothesis by examining
the relationship between moral conviction and preferred social distance. In this research, participants
indicated whether they would be happy to have someone who did not share their views on a particular
issue (e.g., abortion) as their neighbor, personal physician, someone they would date, etc. It was found
that those high in moral conviction (i.e., those with strong moral attitudes) preferred greater social
distance from those with opposite attitudes even when the potential relationship was distant (e.g.,
neighbor). In contrast, those low in moral conviction did not demonstrate this preference. This was
interpreted as evidence that attitudes held with moral conviction are perceived as universal, applying to
all persons in all contexts (Skitka et al., 2005). The present study sought to replicate this effect and
expected high moral conviction to predict greater preferred social distance from those with opposite
attitudes (Hypothesis 4). The relationship between moral conviction and preferred social distance,
however, is an indirect test of the universality hypothesis, and there is no direct evidence that those high
in moral conviction explicitly endorse the belief that their moral standards are universally applicable.
Although the impact of personal relevance on moral conviction (Hypothesis 1) is another indirect test of
the universality hypothesis, a direct test is more desirable.
Skitka (2010) argues that attitudes rooted in moral conviction are perceived as universal,
meaning that the person’s attitude applies to all persons and all contexts, regardless of the culture or
circumstances. Alternatively stated, that person’s attitude would not change depending on the person or
the situation. The opposite, then, of universality is moral relativism, which refers to the extent to which
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an individual rejects formulating or relying on universal moral rules (i.e., absolutes) when making moral
decisions (Schlenker and Forsyth, 1977). Those scoring high on moral relativism believe that what is
ethical varies from situation to situation and person to person. Thus moral absolutes cannot be
forwarded and pronouncements of good and bad cannot be indiscriminately applied to all situations.
Extending the ITMC’s universality hypothesis to moral relativism, high moral conviction should predict
low moral relativism.
While an established measure of moral universalism does not currently exist, a measure of moral
relativism – the opposite side of the coin – does (Forsyth, 1980). Examining the relationship between
moral conviction and moral relativism provides a more direct test of the universality hypothesis that has
been missing from the literature. Toward this end, study 2 included a measure of moral relativism (with
items tailored to the specific issues) and predicted that high moral conviction would predict low moral
relativism (Hypothesis 5). Low moral relativism (i.e., high universalism) was also expected to predict
greater preferred social distance (Hypothesis 6), and to mediate the relationship between moral
conviction and preferred social distance (Hypothesis 7).
Finally, it was predicted that high personal relevance would indirectly increase preferred social
distance through moral conviction and moral relativism (Hypothesis 8). More specifically, high
personal relevance would increase moral conviction, increased moral conviction would lower moral
relativism, and lower moral relativism would lead to greater preferred social distance.
The Present Study
Study 2’s primary objectives were to, 1) identify potential antecedents to moral conviction, and
2) test the universality, objectivity, and emotion hypotheses from the Integrated Theory of Moral
Conviction (ITMC). Participants read and responded to questions regarding scenarios related to
abortion and building nuclear power plants. Participants encountered both scenarios during their
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participation, but personal relevance was manipulated between subjects for each issue. The following
hypotheses were proposed and tested:
Hypothesis 1: Personal relevance will have a direct effect on moral conviction, such that high
personal relevance will increase moral conviction.
Hypothesis 2: Attitude correctness will significantly predict moral conviction, such that high
attitude correctness will predict high moral conviction.
Hypothesis 3: Attitude intensity will significantly predict moral conviction, such that high
attitude intensity will predict high moral conviction.
Hypothesis 4: Moral conviction will significantly predict preferred social distance, such that
high moral conviction will predict greater preferred social distance.
Hypothesis 5: Moral conviction will significantly predict moral relativism, such that high moral
conviction will predict low moral relativism (i.e., high moral universality).
Hypothesis 6: Moral relativism will significantly predict preferred social distance, with low
moral relativism predicting greater preferred social distance.
Hypothesis 7: Moral relativism will mediate the effect of moral conviction on preferred social
distance. Specifically, high moral conviction will predict low moral relativism, which will predict
greater preferred social distance.
Hypothesis 8: High personal relevance will indirectly increase preferred social distance through
moral conviction and moral relativism. High personal relevance will increase moral conviction, which
lowers moral relativism, which increases preferred social distance.
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Study 2 Methods
Participants
The final sample included data from 460 (296 female, 163 male, 1 no response) undergraduate
students at the University of Texas at El Paso (N=322) and Lock Haven University of Pennsylvia
(N=138). An online survey application – SurveyMonkey – was used to collect data and participants
received partial credit toward a course requirement in return for their participation. Participant ages
ranged from 17 to 56 with an average age of 21.7 years. Two hundred sixty nine participants selfidentified as of Hispanic ethnicity (58.5%) with the remaining participants identifying as non-Hispanic
(190; 41.3%).
Materials8
In the survey, participants read two different scenarios and responded to items concerning
decisions made in the scenarios. Specifically, the scenarios related the decision to get an abortion (made
by either the participant’s romantic partner or by an unknown individual) and the decision to build a new
nuclear power plant (made by the federal government). Personal relevance was manipulated using these
scenarios. Order of issue presentation (abortion – nuclear power; nuclear power – abortion) was
counterbalanced across participants. Participants then indicated their agreement with the decision
reached, ranked factors that may have influenced their agreement, rated the personal relevance of the
scenario, and answered items measuring moral conviction, relativism/idealism (issue specific), attitude
strength (extremity, importance, certainty, intensity), and preferred social distance.

8

A small proportion of participants (40; 8.7%) completed a pretest survey in which they answered items concerning attitude
strength (extremity, importance, certainty, and intensity), and moral conviction toward abortion and building nuclear power
plants, and asked participants to rate the relatedness of these issues to the moral foundations. Participants also completed
items designed to measure moral idealism and relativism regarding these two specific issues. They then completed the Moral
Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ; Graham et al., 2011), the Ethics Position Questionnaire (EPQ; Forsyth, 1980), indicated
their political orientation, the extent to which they perceived abortion and building nuclear power plants to be “moral” issues,
and finally their religious participation. Due to an error in data collection, this data is not included in any analyses and thus
will not be further discussed.
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Scenarios. To manipulate personal relevance we created scenarios of high or low personal
relevance for both the abortion and building nuclear power plants issues.
Abortion. Three scenarios (two high personal relevance, one low) were created to describe a
situation in which a couple had to decide whether to seek an abortion. The low personal relevance
scenario described the situation as involving a pair of strangers, named Seth and Julie. The high
personal relevance scenario described the situation as involving the participant’s significant other, and
participants in this condition were asked their gender immediately prior to ensure receipt of a gender
appropriate version (thus there were two high personal relevance scenarios). Below is the high personal
relevance (HPR) scenario for a male participant (for all three complete scenarios, see Appendix B):

“You and your girlfriend have been dating for 10 months when you discover that she is 6
weeks pregnant. You both work and attend school, but if you decide to have the baby one
or both of you will need to quit school to make financial ends meet. On top of that, the
pregnancy is accompanied by a medical condition that may complicate pregnancy and/or
birth. You sit down together one evening and your girlfriend suggests that it would be
best to get an abortion.”

Building nuclear power plants. Two scenarios were created in which a decision was made to
build a new nuclear power plant in the vicinity of a moderately sized city. In the low personal relevance
condition, a decision was made to build a nuclear power plant near Yakima Firing Range in Washington
state. In the high personal relevance condition, a decision was made to build a nuclear power plant near
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White Sands Missile Range (50 miles outside the El Paso city limits) 9. Below is the low personal
relevance scenario (for both complete scenarios, see Appendix B):

“In an effort to meet growing energy demands, the United States government plans to
build several new nuclear power plants on U.S. soil. One of these plants will be built near
Yakima Firing Range in Washington state, less than 50 miles outside the Ellensburg city
limits. While the new plant would provide a new energy source and job opportunities,
there is a growing concern regarding safety for the surrounding region. Nuclear waste
products can cause tremendous harm to both people and the environment, and there is
potential that the plant might be targeted in future terrorist attacks, flooding the entire
region with deadly nuclear radiation. Despite intense protest from locals in Ellensburg
and Yakima, the government has decided to build the nuclear power plant within the next
year.”

Agreement. After reading the scenario regarding the decision to get an abortion [build a nuclear
power plant], participants indicated their agreement with this decision using a 7-point bipolar scale
ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree with neither agree or disagree as a neutral center
point.
Influences on agreement. This variable was included to gather exploratory data for the design
of future studies and will not be discussed further. Participants were asked to rank the extent to which a
variety of different factors may have influenced their agreement with the decision to get an abortion
[build a nuclear power plant] in the scenario they read. The listed factors included “Commandments

9

The high personal relevance scenario for building nuclear power plants was created for participants currently residing in the
El Paso metro area. As a result, both the high and low personal relevance scenarios qualify as low personal relevance for
participants recruited from Lock Haven University. Thus all participants from Lock Haven were coded as low personal
relevance for the nuclear power plants issue.
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from a supreme being (e.g., God)”, “It is simply how any good person would respond”, “It is the most
practical and reasonable response”, “My culture’s beliefs and/or laws”, and “My own personal
preferences and opinions”. It was also an option to select “other” and specify in a separate text box.
Participants ranked these factors from strongest influence to weakest influence and could also select not
applicable if one of the factors had no influence on their agreement. The same scale was also presented
after reading the scenario regarding the decision to build a nuclear power plant on U.S. soil.
Personal relevance manipulation check. Several items were included to determine whether the
personal relevance manipulation had the desired effect. Participants used a 7-point scale with options
ranging from not at all to extremely with moderately as a center point to answer the following three
items: “How much do you think the decision to [have or not have an abortion/ build or not build the
nuclear power plant] in the scenario affects you?”, “How much does the decision to [have or not have an
abortion/ build or not build the nuclear power plant] in the scenario apply or relate to your life?”, “How
much does the decision to [have or not have an abortion/ build or not build the nuclear power plant] in
the scenario affect you personally?”. Participants were also asked to briefly state the reasons they
thought the decision in the scenario did or did not affect them. Participants responded to this item by
directly typing into a provided text box.
Moral conviction. An updated scale was used to measure moral conviction, obtained from
Linda Skitka’s personal/lab webpage (Skitka, 2011). The scale began with the stem, “To what extent is
your position on [abortion/building nuclear power plants]” and was followed by four stem completions:
“...a reflection of your core moral beliefs and convictions?”, “...connected to your beliefs about
fundamental right and wrong?”, “...based on moral principle?”, and “...a moral stance?” Participants
completed this scale for both the abortion and building nuclear plants issues and responses were made
on a 5-point scale ranging from not at all to very much. Responses were coded from 1 to 5, with scores
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ranging from 4 to 20. Higher scores indicate higher moral conviction. The scale demonstrated good
reliability for both the abortion and nuclear power plant issues (α’s = .917 and .899, respectively).
Moral relativism and idealism. Moral relativism for each issue was measured using the
following three items: “The acceptability of [abortion/building nuclear power plants] varies from one
situation and society to another”, “No rule concerning [abortion/building nuclear power plants] can be
formulated; whether it is permissible or not permissible totally depends on the situation”, and “Whether
[abortion/building nuclear power plants] is judged to be moral or immoral depends upon the
circumstances surrounding the action.” Participants indicated their responses using a 9-point scale
ranging from completely disagree to completely agree, with neither agree or disagree as a center point.
Responses were coded from 1 to 9, with scores ranging from 3 to 27 and higher scores indicating great
moral universalism (i.e., lower moral relativism). This scale demonstrated fair reliability for both the
abortion and nuclear power plant issues (α’s = .798 and .719, respectively).
Moral idealism for each issue was also measured using the following four items:
“[Abortion/Building nuclear power plants] should never be tolerated, irrespective of how small the risks
might be”, “[Abortion/Building nuclear power plants] is always wrong, irrespective of the benefits to be
gained”, “It is never necessary to [get an abortion/build nuclear power plants]”, and “Deciding whether
or not to [get an abortion/build nuclear power plants] by balancing the positive consequences against the
negative consequences is immoral.” Participants indicated their responses using a 9-point scale ranging
from completely disagree to completely agree, with neither agree or disagree as a center point.
Responses were coded from 1 to 9, with scores ranging from 3 to 27 and higher scores indicating great
idealism. This scale demonstrated good reliability for both the abortion and nuclear power plant issues
(α’s = .904 and .878, respectively).
Attitude strength. Attitude strength was captured using attitude extremity, important, certainty,
and intensity (Petty & Krosnick, 1995). While study 1 measured extremity, importance, and certainty
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with a scale previously used by Skitka and colleagues (2005), the items used in study 2 more closely
mirror those used in attitude strength research (for review, see Krosnick et al., 1993) or reflect more
recent developments in our understanding of these attitude strength dimensions (e.g., Petrocelli,
Tormala, & Rucker, 2007). Study 2 also measured an additional attitude strength dimension, attitude
intensity. Participants completed these attitude strength scales for both abortion and building nuclear
power plants.
Extremity. Although attitude extremity did not significantly predict moral conviction in study 1,
significant correlations between these variables in previous research (e.g., Skitka et al., 2005) led us to
include it in study 2. Attitude extremity was measured using three semantic differential items.
Participants rated the attitude object (abortion, building nuclear power plants) on three 7-point bipolar
adjective scales: very bad – very good, very negative – very positive, very desirable – very undesirable
(reverse coded). Responses were coded from – 3 to +3 and extremity was assessed by calculating the
absolute value of the deviation of responses from the scale midpoints and adding these together. Thus
scores could range from 0 to 9 with higher scores indicating greater attitude extremity10. This scale
demonstrated good reliability for both the abortion and nuclear power plant issues (α’s = .906 and .905,
respectively).
Importance. Attitude importance was measured using the following three items: “How important
is the issue of [abortion/building nuclear power plants] to you in comparison to other issues?”, “How
much do you care about the issue of [abortion/building nuclear power plants]?”, and “How important is
the issue of [abortion/building nuclear power plants] to you personally?”. Participants indicated their
responses using a 7-point scale ranging from not at all to extremely with moderately as the scale center
point. Responses were coded from 1 to 7, with scores ranging from 3 to 21. Higher scores indicate
10 It should be noted that participants made minimal use of responses at the “positive” end of these particular items. Even the
strongest pro-choice advocates may not be willing to endorse the view that abortion itself is good or very good. It is
therefore likely that pro-choice participants indicated much more neutral (neither bad nor good) attitudes toward this
particular issue than if the issue had been framed as legalizing abortion. Variability on this scale (SE = .155), however, was
comparable to that observed for the issue of building nuclear power plants (SE = .120).
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higher importance. This scale demonstrated good reliability for both the abortion and nuclear power
plant issues (α’s = .919 and .877, respectively).
Certainty. Petrocelli and colleagues (2007) argue that attitude certainty is composed of two
distinct factors – attitude clarity and attitude correctness. Study 2 adopted the items used by Petrocelli
and colleagues (2007) to measure attitude clarity and correctness.
Attitude clarity was measured using the following four items: “To what extent is your true
attitude toward the issue of [abortion/building nuclear power plants] clear in your mind?”, “How certain
are you that the attitude you just expressed toward [abortion/building nuclear power plants] is really the
attitude you have?”, “How certain are you that the attitude you expressed toward [abortion/building
nuclear power plants] really reflects your true thoughts and feelings?”, and “How certain are you that
you know what your true attitude on [abortion/building nuclear power plants] really is?” Participants
indicated their responses using a 7-point scale ranging from not at all to extremely with moderately as
the scale center point. Responses were coded from 1 to 7, with scores on this scale ranging from 4 to 28.
Higher scores indicate higher attitude clarity. This scale demonstrated good reliability for both the
abortion and nuclear power plant issues (α’s = .941 and .904, respectively).
Attitude correctness was measured using the following three items: “How certain are you that of
all the possible attitudes one might have toward [abortion/building nuclear power plants], your attitude
reflects the right way to think and feel about the issue?”, “To what extent do you think other people
should have the same attitude as you on this issue?”, and “How certain are you that your attitude toward
[abortion/building nuclear power plants] is the correct attitude to have?” Participants indicated their
responses using a 7-point scale ranging from not at all to extremely with moderately as the scale center
point. Responses were coded from 1 to 7, with scores on this scale ranging from 3 to 21. Higher scores
indicate higher perceived attitude correctness. This scale demonstrated good reliability for both the
abortion and nuclear power plant issues (α’s = .87 and .833, respectively).
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Attitude intensity. Attitude intensity was measured using the following three items: “How strong
are your emotions when you think about the issue of [abortion/building nuclear power plants]?”, “What
is the intensity of your emotional reaction to [abortion/building nuclear power plants] compared with
other public issues?”, and “How intense do you think your emotional reaction to [abortion/building
nuclear power plants] is compared with how most other people might react? Participants indicated their
responses using a 7-point scale ranging from not at all to extremely with moderately as the scale center
point. Responses were coded from 1 to 7, with scores ranging from 3 to 21. Higher scores indicate
higher attitude intensity. This scale demonstrated good reliability for both the abortion and nuclear
power plant issues (α’s = .873 and .884, respectively).
Preferred social distance. Skitka and colleagues (2005) presented indirect evidence for the
universality of moral attitudes by measuring the influence of moral conviction on preferred social
distance. Results indicated that those high in moral conviction preferred greater social distance from
both socially distant (e.g., owner of store I frequent) and socially intimate (e.g., person I would date)
individuals with a different attitude, whereas this preference for greater social distance was only
observed for socially intimate relationships in those with strong nonmoral attitudes. The present study
sought to test the universality hypothesis of the Integrated Theory of Moral Conviction (ITMC) directly
(by measuring moral relativism) and indirectly (by measuring preferred social distance). Preferred
social distance was measured using the same scale used by Skitka and colleagues (2005). The scale
begins with the statement stem, “I would be happy to have someone who does not share my views on
[abortion/building nuclear power plants]…”, followed by ten stem completions representing socially
distant (e.g., “…as President of the United States.”) and socially intimate (e.g., “…to marry into my
family.”) relationships (see Appendix B for complete scale). Participants indicated their agreement on
these items using a 7-point bipolar scale ranging from very much disagree to very much agree with
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neither disagree or agree as a neutral center point. This scale demonstrated good reliability for both the
abortion and nuclear power plant issues (α’s = .931 and .932, respectively).
Given that the primary difference on this variable between those high and low on moral
conviction was for distant relationships (Skitka et al., 2005), only items pertaining to distant
relationships were aggregated for analyses. This included the following five relationships: President of
the United States, neighbor, spiritual advisor, owner of a store or restaurant frequented, and personal
physician. Scores on this variable could thus range from 5 to 35, lower scores indicating greater desired
social distance.
Procedure
After a participant signed up for the experiment they were provided with a link to the online
informed consent form. Having signed the form they emailed the researcher to request an access code,
were randomly assigned to one of the four versions of the survey, and were emailed a link to their
assigned survey version. Having completed the online survey, participants were instructed to email a
completion code to a research assistant, who then confirmed receipt of their completion code and
provided the participant with a debriefing document.
A small portion (40; 8.7%) of participants completed an initial pretest survey prior to completing
the above described survey (see footnote 3). This difference among participants was explicitly coded (0
= no pretest, 1 = took pretest) but had no effect on moral conviction for either moral issue (both p’s >
.30). This variable was dropped from analyses and is not further discussed.
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Study 2 Results
Data Preparation
Data were prepared for analysis by imputing missing data (0.66% missingness) with a single
imputation using the multiple imputation option in PRELIS 2.20 (Jöreskog & Sörbom, 2006). For each
issue, aggregate variables were created for the personal relevance manipulation check, attitude strength
dimensions (extremity, importance, clarity, correctness, intensity), moral conviction, moral relativism,
and preferred social distance (distant relationships).
Internal Consistency
Measure reliabilities were assessed using Cronbach’s alpha. The moral conviction measures
demonstrated good reliability (α’s = .917 and .899, for abortion and nuclear power plants, respectively),
as did the preferred social distance measure (α’s = .931 and .932, for abortion and nuclear power plants,
respectively). Reliability for the moral relativism measure was a bit less favorable, although still
acceptable (α’s = .798 and .719, for abortion and nuclear power plants, respectively). As a whole, the
attitude strength measures demonstrated good reliability for both the issue of abortion (α’s = .906, .919,
.941, .870, and .873 for extremity, importance, clarity, correctness, and intensity, respectively) and
building nuclear power plants (α’s = .905, .877, .904, .833, and .884 for extremity, importance, clarity,
correctness, and intensity, respectively).
Attitude Strength Structure
Analyses revealed particularly strong correlations among several of the attitude strength
measures (see Table 7). In particular, attitude importance and attitude intensity were strongly correlated
(r’s = .879 and .846 for abortion and nuclear power plants, respectively), as well as attitude clarity and
correctness (r’s = .708 and .711 for abortion and nuclear power plants, respectively).
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Table 7: Intercorrelations among attitude strength dimensions.

Abortion
Attitude
extremity

Attitude
importance

Attitude
clarity

Attitude
correctness

Attitude
intensity

Attitude
extremity

1.0

Attitude
importance

.410

1.0

Attitude
clarity

.170

.597

1.0

Attitude
correctness

.331

.627

.708

1.0

Attitude
intensity

.439

.879

.589

.646

1.0

Attitude
correctness

Attitude
intensity

Nuclear power plants
Attitude
extremity

Attitude
importance

Attitude
clarity

Attitude
extremity

1.0

Attitude
importance

.431

1.0

Attitude
clarity

.256

.515

1.0

Attitude
correctness

.384

.632

.711

Attitude
.440
.846
.507
intensity
All intercorrelations are significant at the p = .01 level.

1.0
.692

1.0

Due to the presence of these strong intercorrelations, an exploratory factor analysis was
conducted for each issue, using a direct oblimin rotation. A three factor solution resulted from both
analyses in which attitude importance and intensity items loaded onto Factor 1, the attitude extremity
items loaded negatively onto Factor 2 (attitude neutrality), and the attitude clarity and correctness items
loaded onto Factor 3. Factors 1 and 3 correlated positively (r’s = .671 and .591 for abortion and nuclear
power, respectively), while Factor 2 correlated negatively with both Factor 1 (r’s = -.480 and -.488 for
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abortion and nuclear power, respectively) and Factor 3 (r’s = -.246 and -.300 for abortion and nuclear
power, respectively).
These results raised concerns regarding multicollinearity in the originally planned analyses.
While attitude clarity and correctness have distinct antecedents and play independent roles in persuasion
(Petrocelli et al., 2007), these constructs remain significantly correlated and may pose a threat to the
validity of results should they both be included in the present study’s analyses. Given that a specific
hypothesis was forwarded for attitude correctness – but not clarity – it was decided that attitude clarity
would be dropped from all further analyses. The strong correlation between attitude importance and
attitude intensity posed another dilemma given that both would be expected to predict moral conviction
– increases in attitude intensity (importance) should predict increases in moral conviction11. To include
both measures in analyses, however, could introduce multicollinearity. A decision was made to focus
primarily on attitude intensity due to its greater theoretical interest, but results from analyses using
attitude importance were included for comparison, where appropriate.
Manipulation Check
Two one-way ANOVAs were run on the personal relevance manipulation check variables to test
the efficacy of the personal relevance manipulation. For the abortion scenario, a total of 232 participants
were assigned to the low personal relevance condition and 228 assigned to the high personal relevance
condition. Participants in the high personal relevance condition rated the decision in the scenario as
more personally relevant (Mhigh = 14.86, SE = .379) than participants in the low personal relevance
condition (Mlow = 8.70, SE = .353), F (1, 458) = 141.99, p < .001. All Lock Haven participants received
low personal relevance scenarios for the issue of nuclear power (see footnote 4). Thus the low personal
relevance condition contained a total of 299 participants and the high personal relevance condition

11

Although an explicit hypothesis was not forwarded for attitude importance, study 1 indicated that moral conviction was
consistently predicted by this attitude dimension. It was therefore expected that importance would predict moral conviction
in study 2.
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contained 161 participants. Participants in the high personal relevance condition rated the decision to
build a nuclear power plant in the scenario as more personally relevant (Mhigh = 13.91, SE = .381) than
participants in the low personal relevance condition (Mlow = 10.01, SE = .278), F (1, 457) = 34.64, p <
.001. The scenarios presented therefore appear to have successfully manipulated perceived personal
relevance for both the abortion and nuclear power plants issues.
Personal Relevance and Moral Conviction
Hypothesis 1 predicted that high personal relevance would increase moral conviction for both
issues. Simple one-way ANOVAs supported this prediction for abortion but not for building nuclear
power plants. Participants in the high personal relevance condition expressed higher moral conviction
toward the issue of abortion (Mhigh = 15.37, SE = .285) than participants in the low personal relevance
condition (Mlow = 13.55, SE = .314), F (1, 458) = 18.31, p < .001. However, there was no difference in
moral conviction toward building nuclear power plants between participants in the high (Mhigh = 11.17,
SE = .241) and low (Mlow = 11.72, SE = .367) personal relevance conditions, F (1, 458) = .875, p .41812.
To more stringently test the impact of personal relevance on moral conviction, analyses were
conducted holding the effects of attitude strength variables constant.

Two hierarchical regression

analyses were run (one per issue) in which participant age and gender were entered in block 1, attitude
extremity, correctness, and intensity entered in block 2, and personal relevance (high vs. low) entered in
block 3 (see Table 8). After controlling for the effects of age, gender, and attitude strength13, personal
relevance accounted for a significant amount of unique variance in moral conviction toward abortion,
∆R2 = .013, F∆ (1, 445) = 8.98, p = .003. Consistent with the main analysis, personal relevance did not
account for a significant amount of unique variance in moral conviction toward building nuclear power
plants after controlling for age, gender, and attitude strength, ∆R2 = .005, F∆ (1, 445) = 2.43, p = .12. It
12

This difference was also not significant when the analysis was performed on UTEP students only (i.e., Lock Haven
participants omitted from the analysis), F (1, 319) = 2.37, p = .095.
13 Personal relevance remains a significant predictor of moral conviction toward abortion when attitude importance is also
included in block 2 of the analysis.
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therefore appears that high personal relevance increases moral conviction toward the issue of abortion,
but has no discernable effect on moral conviction toward building nuclear power plants (Hypothesis 1
partially supported).

Table 8: Hierarchical regression analyses testing the effect of personal relevance on moral conviction
(DV), holding gender, age, and attitude strength (extremity, correctness, intensity) constant.
Coefficients are from the final model.

Abortion
Variable

B

SE

p

Gender
Age

.010
.021

.364
.037

.969
.562

.459

.058

< .001

.066

.036

.065

.225

.040

< .001

1.03

.344

.003

Variable

B

SE

p

Gender
Age

-1.435
-.021

.406
.041

< .001
.604

.145

.083

.081

.055

.048

.255

.186

.049

< .001

-.614

.394

.120

Block 1: R2 = .004, F (2, 449) = .901, p = .407

Block 2: ∆R2 = .364, F∆ (3, 446) = 85.5, p < .001
Attitude
extremity
Attitude
correctness
Attitude
intensity
Block 3: ∆R2 = .013, F∆ (1, 445) = 8.98, p = .003
Personal
relevance
Nuclear power plants
2

Block 1: R = .037, F (2, 449) = 8.65, p < .001

Block 2: ∆R2 = .115, F∆ (3, 446) = 20.2, p < .001
Attitude
extremity
Attitude
correctness
Attitude
intensity
Block 3: ∆R2 = .005, F∆ (1, 445) = 2.43, p = .120
Personal
relevance
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Attitude Strength and Moral Conviction
High attitude correctness was expected to predict high moral conviction (Hypothesis 2) and high
attitude intensity was expected to predict high moral conviction (Hypothesis 3). Hierarchical
regressions were run on each issue in which gender and age were entered in block 1 and attitude
extremity, correctness, and intensity were entered in block 214. In this analysis, Hypothesis 2 was not
supported – attitude correctness only marginally predicted moral conviction toward abortion (B = .067,
SE = .036, p = .062) and did not significantly predict moral conviction toward building nuclear power
plants (B = .061, SE = .048, p = .202). Hypothesis 3, however, was fully supported. Participants who
reported high attitude intensity also reported high moral conviction toward both abortion (B = .230, SE =
.040, p < .001) and building nuclear power plants (B = .180, SE = .049, p < .001).
A slightly different picture emerges when attitude intensity is replaced by attitude importance in
block 2 of the preceding analysis. Similar to attitude intensity, high attitude importance predicts high
moral conviction toward abortion (B = .202, SE = .038, p < .001) and building nuclear power plants (B =
.141, SE = .045, p = .002). Unlike before, however, attitude correctness becomes a significant predictor
of moral conviction; high attitude correctness predicts high moral conviction toward abortion (B = .078,
SE = .036, p = .029) and building nuclear power plants (B = .095, SE = .045, p = .035).
Finally, when both attitude importance and intensity are included in block 2, attitude importance
no longer significantly predicts moral conviction (p’s = .151 and .410 for abortion and nuclear power
plants, respectively), nor does attitude correctness (p’s = .116 and .235 for abortion and nuclear power
plants, respectively). But high attitude intensity continues to significantly predict high moral conviction

14

Suspicions of multicollinearity were confirmed when all five attitude strength dimensions were entered in block 2.
Tolerance scores of .40 or lower indicate that multicollinearity may be a problem. For the issue of abortion, tolerance scores
for attitude intensity and importance were .207 and .212, respectively. Tolerance scores for attitude correctness and clarity
were .402 and .427, respectively. Tolerance values increased to .511 for attitude intensity and .574 for attitude correctness
when importance and clarity were omitted. For the issue of building nuclear power plants, tolerance scores for attitude
intensity and importance were .231 and .268, respectively. Tolerance scores for attitude correctness and clarity were .328 and
.466, respectively. Tolerance values increased to .464 for attitude intensity and .486 for attitude correctness when importance
and clarity were omitted.
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toward abortion (B = .160, SE = .063, p = .011) and building nuclear power plants (B = .140, SE = .069,
p = .043). The disparity between these sets of results is most likely due to multicollinearity. As
previously stated, there is a high correlation between attitude importance and intensity (r’s = .879 and
.846 for abortion and nuclear power plants, respectively), but there is also a relatively high correlation
between attitude intensity and correctness (r’s = .646 and .692 for abortion and nuclear power plants,
respectively). The inclusion of attitude intensity therefore negates the predictive ability of attitude
importance as well as that of attitude correctness.
Additional analyses were run to determine whether personal relevance significantly interacts
with attitude extremity, correctness, and intensity to predict moral conviction. Two hierarchical
regression analyses (one per issue) were run in which block 1 contained age and gender, block 2
contained the attitude strength variables, block 3 contained the personal relevance variable (high vs.
low), and block 4 contained three interaction variable – an attitude extremity by personal relevance
interaction, an attitude correctness by personal relevance interaction, and an attitude intensity by
personal relevance interaction. These interactions did not account for significant observed variance in
moral conviction for both the issue of abortion (∆R2 = .002, F∆ (3, 442) = .405, p = .749) and building
nuclear power plants (∆R2 = .004, F∆ (3, 442) = .701, p = .552). Thus personal relevance did not
significantly interact with attitude strength in the prediction of moral conviction.
Moral Conviction and Social Distance
In previous research, high moral conviction significantly predicted a preference for greater social
distance from (distant) relations holding different attitudes (Skitka et al., 2005, study 2). In the present
study moral conviction was expected to significantly predict preferred social distance (Hypothesis 4),
replicating Skitka’s and colleagues’ (2005) results. Controlling for the effects of age and gender, high
moral conviction was found to significantly predict greater preferred social distance (i.e., lower scores
on the social distance measure) from those holding a different view on abortion (B = -.211, SE = .064, p
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= .001). This effect was not replicated, however, for the issue of building nuclear power plants (B = .094, SE = .063, p = .138). Moreover, when the effects of attitude strength (extremity, correctness, and
intensity) were also held constant, moral conviction no longer predicted preferred social distance for
either issue (See Table 9)15. The effect of moral conviction on preferred social distance was therefore
only partly replicated. That is, moral conviction significantly predicted preferred social distance only
when covariates (attitude strength dimensions) were omitted from the analysis16 and the issue was
related to abortion.

15

When attitude importance replaced attitude intensity in this same analysis the effect of moral conviction on preferred social
distance remained nonsignificant (p = .27 and .68 for abortion and nuclear power plants, respectively).
16 For these analyses only items referring to “distant” social relations were included in social distance scores (see Materials).
The pattern of results is identical when all social distance items are included in the analysis.
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Table 9: Hierarchical regression analyses testing the effect of moral conviction on preferred social
distance (DV), holding gender, age, and attitude strength (extremity, correctness, intensity)
constant. Coefficients are from the final model.

Abortion
Variable

B

SE

p

Gender
Age

.683
.004

.598
.061

.254
.948

-.454

.101

< .001

-.169

.059

.004

.023

.077

.623

.038

.077

.623

Variable

B

SE

p

Gender

1.13

.579

.051

Age

-.004

.058

.949

-.363

.117

.002

-.012

.067

.854

-.034

.070

.630

-.027

.067

.684

2

Block 1: R = .005, F (2, 449) = 1.05, p = .350

Block 2: ∆R2 = .098, F∆ (3, 446) = 16.2, p < .001
Attitude
extremity
Attitude
correctness
Attitude
intensity
Block 3: ∆R2 = .000, F∆ (1, 445) = .242, p = .623
Moral
conviction
Nuclear power plants
2

Block 1: R = .013, F (2, 449) = 2.97, p = .052

Block 2: ∆R2 = .036, F∆ (3, 446) = 5.66, p = .001
Attitude
extremity
Attitude
correctness
Attitude
intensity
Block 3: ∆R2 = .000, F∆ (1, 445) = .166, p = .684
Moral
conviction

Two hierarchical regression analyses (one per issue) were run in which personal relevance was
entered in block 4 and the interaction between personal relevance and moral conviction was entered in
block 5. Personal relevance did not significantly predict preferred social distance from those with
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different views on abortion (B = 4.55, p = .254) or building nuclear power plants (B = .268, p = .930).
The interaction between personal relevance and moral conviction also failed to significantly predict
preferred social distance for both abortion (B = -.260, p = .319) and building nuclear power plants (B =
.046, p = .856).
Next the direct effect of moral conviction on moral relativism was tested (Hypothesis 5).
Controlling for age and gender, high moral conviction significantly predicted low moral relativism
toward abortion (B = -.184, SE = .068, p = .007), but this effect was only marginally significant for the
issue of building nuclear power plants (B = -.099, SE = .057, p = .081). When attitude extremity,
correctness, and intensity were also held constant (see Table 10), however, high moral conviction
significantly predicted higher moral relativism toward abortion (B = .190, SE = .079, p = .016). This
opposite effect may also be the result of multicollinearity, given that moral conviction toward abortion
correlates significantly with attitude extremity (r = .502, p = .01), attitude correctness (r = .410, p = .01),
and attitude intensity (r = .527, p = .01). Moral conviction did not significantly predict moral relativism
toward building nuclear power plants when attitude strength dimensions were held constant (B = .014,
SE = .056, p = .804). Hypothesis 5 was therefore partially supported for the issue of abortion – moral
conviction predicted moral relativism in the expected direction only when attitude strength measures
were omitted as covariates – but was not supported for the issue of building nuclear power plants.
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Table 10: Hierarchical regression analyses testing the effect of moral conviction on moral relativism
(DV), holding gender, age, and attitude strength (extremity, correctness, intensity) constant.
Coefficients are from the final model.

Abortion
Variable

B

SE

p

Gender
Age

-1.46
-.126

.610
.062

.017
.042

-.914

.104

< .001

-.016

.06

.788

-.037

.07

.599

.190

.079

.016

Variable

B

SE

p

Gender

.491

.489

.315

Age

-.032

.049

.509

-.635

.098

< .001

.177

.057

.002

-.217

.059

< .001

.014

.056

.804

2

Block 1: R = .005, F (2, 449) = 1.05, p = .350

Block 2: ∆R2 = .098, F∆ (3, 446) = 16.2, p < .001
Attitude
extremity
Attitude
correctness
Attitude
intensity
Block 3: ∆R2 = .000, F∆ (1, 445) = .242, p = .623
Moral
conviction
Nuclear power plants
2

Block 1: R = .013, F (2, 449) = 2.97, p = .052

Block 2: ∆R2 = .036, F∆ (3, 446) = 5.66, p = .001
Attitude
extremity
Attitude
correctness
Attitude
intensity
Block 3: ∆R2 = .000, F∆ (1, 445) = .166, p = .684
Moral
conviction

Two additional hierarchical regression analyses (one per issue) were run in which personal
relevance was included in block 4 and the interaction between personal relevance and moral conviction
was entered in block 5. Personal relevance did not significantly predict moral relativism for abortion (B
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= -.428, p = .829) or building nuclear power plants (B = -.327, p = .801). The interaction between
personal relevance and moral conviction also failed to significantly predict moral relativism for abortion
(B = .074, p = .565) and building nuclear power plants (B = .063, p = .555).
A similar set of hierarchical regression analyses were also run to test whether moral relativism
predicts preferred social distance (Hypothesis 6). Controlling for age and gender, low moral relativism
significantly predicted greater preferred social distance (i.e., lower scores on this measure) for both
abortion (B = .457, SE = .089, p < .001) and building nuclear power plants (B = .471, p < .001). These
effects remained significant for both abortion (B = .268, SE = .094, p = .005) and building nuclear power
plants (B = .374, SE = .111, p = .001), even after controlling for the effect of attitude extremity, attitude
correctness, and attitude intensity on preferred social distance in block 2. Hypothesis 6 was therefore
fully supported; low moral relativism significantly predicted greater preferred social distance.
Moral relativism was expected to mediate the effect of moral conviction on social distance
(Hypothesis 7). This mediated relationship was tested for both issues using Andrew Hayes’ PROCESS
modeling tool (Hayes, 2012) in SPSS, which generates both a point estimate and 95% bias-corrected
bootstrap confidence interval for indirect effects. Two analyses were run on each issue, for a total of
four separate mediation analyses. In the first analysis, age and gender were entered as covariates to
control for their influence. In the second analysis, age, gender, and attitude extremity, correctness, and
intensity were all entered as covariates. For each analysis, 5000 bootstrap samples were requested.
Entering age and gender as covariates, moral relativism was found to significantly mediate the effect of
moral conviction on preferred social distance for the abortion issue (a1b1 = -.0374, BootSE = .0174, 95%
bias-corrected bootstrap confidence interval = -.0794 ; -.0091). Specifically, high moral conviction
predicted low moral relativism (a1 = -.1841, SE = .068, p = .007), and low moral relativism predicted
greater preferred social distance from those with different views on abortion (b1 = .2033, SE = .043, p <
.0001). Moral relativism did not, however, mediate the effect of moral conviction on preferred social
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distance for the issue of building nuclear power plants (a1b1 = -.0245, BootSE = .0165, 95% biascorrected bootstrap confidence interval = -.0650 ; .0022).
These analyses were repeated on each issue, adding the attitude strength measures as additional
covariates. For the issue of abortion, moral relativism again significantly mediated the effect of moral
conviction on preferred social distance (a1b1 = .0252, BootSE = .0164, 95% bias-corrected bootstrap
confidence interval = .0027 ; .0686), but in the opposite direction from before. That is, high moral
conviction predicted higher moral relativism (a1 = .1898, SE = .079, p = .016), which then predicted less
preferred social distance (b1 = .1327, SE = .046, p = .004), suggesting that increased moral conviction
predicts less preferred social distance. The potential influence of multicollinearity among the attitude
strength variables, however, should once again be kept in mind. For the issue of building nuclear power
plants, moral relativism did not significantly mediate the relationship between moral conviction and
preferred social distance in the second analysis (a1b1 = .0029, BootSE = .0129, 95% bias-corrected
bootstrap confidence interval = -.0218 ; .0309). Hypothesis 7 was therefore partially supported for the
issue of abortion – moral relativism mediated the effect of moral conviction on preferred social distance
in the predicted direction only when attitude strength dimensions were omitted from the analysis – but
was not supported for the issue of building nuclear power plants.
Finally, a second set of mediation analyses were performed to determine whether the personal
relevance manipulation indirectly affected preferred social distance through moral conviction and moral
relativism (see Figure 3).
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Figure 3: Multiple mediation model testing the indirect effect of personal relevance on preferred social
distance.
As before, two analyses were run on each issue. In the first analysis, age and gender were
entered as covariates to control for their influence. In the second analysis, age, gender, and attitude
extremity, correctness, and intensity were all entered as covariates. For each analysis, 5000 bootstrap
samples were requested. Controlling for the effects of age and gender, two indirect paths from personal
relevance to preferred social distance reached significance for the issue of abortion (see Figure 4). First,
the effect of personal relevance on preferred social distance was mediated only by moral conviction.
Specifically, high personal relevance increased preferred social distance (i.e., lowered scores on this
measure; a1b1 = -.2931, BootSE = .1355, 95% bias-corrected bootstrap confidence interval = -.6229 ; .0736) by first increasing moral conviction (a1 = 1.68, SE = .424, p < .001), which led to greater
preferred social distance (b1 = -.1742, SE = .064, p = .007). The effect of personal relevance was also
significantly mediated by both moral conviction and moral relativism. That is, high personal relevance
increased preferred social distance (a1a3b2 = -.0672, BootSE = .0347, 95% bias-corrected bootstrap
confidence interval = -.1719 ; -.0194) by increasing moral conviction (a1 = 1.68, SE = .424, p < .001),
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which decreased moral relativism (a3 = -.1965, SE = .069, p = .005), which then led to greater preferred
social distance (b2 = .2032, SE = .0431, p < .001). Through these paths, increasing personal relevance
caused participants to prefer greater social distance from those who hold different views on abortion.
There were no significant indirect effects for the issue of building nuclear power plants.

-.1965

Moral
Conviction

Moral
Relativism

1.68

.4189
-.4344

Personal
Relevance

Social
Distance

Age

Gender
(Covariates)

Figure 4: Multiple mediation model testing the indirect effect of personal relevance on preferred social
distance for abortion, holding age and gender constant. The dotted path represents the first
described indirect path. The dashed path represents the second described indirect effect.
For both indirect effects the path between personal relevance and moral conviction are
significant, resulting in a solid line.
Adding attitude extremity, correctness, and intensity as covariates once again altered results. For
the issue of abortion, moral conviction and moral relativism still significantly mediated the effect of
personal relevance on preferred social distance (a1a3b2 = .0241, BootSE = .0177, 95% bias-corrected
bootstrap confidence interval = .0030 ; .0802), but this effect was opposite from before (see Figure 5).
High personal relevance increased moral conviction (a1 = 1.03, SE = .344, p = .003), but high moral
conviction increased rather than decreased moral relativism (a3 = .1771, SE = .079, p = .026), which led
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to less preferred social distance (b2 = .1323, SE = .0462, p = .004). When attitude strength dimensions
are held constant, increasing personal relevance actually decreases preferred social distance from those
holding different views on abortion. However, this may once again be an artifact of multicollinearity.
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Figure 5: Multiple mediation model testing the indirect effect of personal relevance on preferred social
distance for abortion, holding age, gender, and attitude strength constant. The bolded path
represents the significant indirect effect of personal relevance on social distance.
As before, there were no significant indirect effects of personal relevance on preferred social distance
for the issue of building nuclear power plants. Hypothesis 8 was therefore partially supported for
abortion – high personal relevance indirectly increased preferred social distance when attitude strength
was omitted from the analysis – but was not supported for the issue of building nuclear power plants.
Exploratory Analyses
Two consistent patterns emerged in the above analyses – 1) predictions were largely supported
for the issue of abortion when measures of attitude strength were not included as covariates, and 2)
predictions were not supported for the issue of nuclear power, regardless of whether attitude strength
was held constant.

As previously mentioned, the first pattern is likely the result of issues with
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multicollinearity among the various attitude strength dimensions and moral conviction. The second
pattern appears to go beyond matters of multicollinearity and may be an indication that participants
simply did not perceive building nuclear power plants to be a moral issue. In support of this, moral
conviction was significantly higher toward abortion (M = 14.45) than toward nuclear power (M =
11.52), F (1, 459) = 127.78, p < .001. Moreover, whereas 224 participants could be classified as holding
their attitude toward abortion with moral conviction (scores of 16 or higher on the moral conviction
scale), only 97 participants held their attitude toward building nuclear power plants with moral
conviction. Given this result, additional exploratory mediation analyses were conducted, replacing
moral conviction with attitude extremity in the mediation model (see Figure 6).
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Figure 6: Exploratory mediation model, testing the indirect effect of attitude extremity on preferred
social distance through moral relativism.
Controlling first for the effect of gender and age, moral relativism significantly mediated the
effect of attitude extremity on preferred social distance. This was true for building nuclear power plants
(a1b1 = -.2579, BootSE = .1057, 95% bias-corrected bootstrap confidence interval = -.4884 ; -.0752) and
for abortion (a1b1 = -.2204, BootSE = .0946, 95% bias-corrected bootstrap confidence interval = -.4165 ;
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-.0466). For both issues, increasing attitude extremity predicted lower moral relativism (a1’s = -.6885
and -.8217 for nuclear power plants and abortion, respecitively, p’s < .0001), and lower moral relativism
predicted greater preferred social distance (b1’s = .3746 and .2682, p’s = .0006 and .0049, for nuclear
power plants and abortion, respectively). In addition to this significant indirect effect, increasing
attitude extremity directly predicted greater preferred social distance (c1’s = -.5609 and -.9205, p’s = .01
and .0001 for nuclear power and abortion, respectively).
When gender, age, attitude correctness and intensity, and moral conviction were all held
constant, the effect of attitude extremity on preferred social distance was still significantly mediated by
moral relativism. Again, this was true for the issue of building nuclear power plants (a1b1 = -.2380,
BootSE = .1022, 95% bias-corrected bootstrap confidence interval = -.4840 ; -.0685) and for abortion
(a1b1 = -.2504, BootSE = .1067, 95% bias-corrected bootstrap confidence interval = -.4173 ; -.0476).
Increasing attitude extremity predicted lower moral relativism (a1’s = -.6354 and -.9241 for nuclear
power plants and abortion, respecitively, p’s < .0001), and lower moral relativism predicted greater
preferred social distance (b1’s = .3746 and .2709, p’s = .0008 and .0045, for nuclear power plants and
abortion, respectively). Increasing attitude extremity also directly predicted greater preferred social
distance (c1’s = -.4793 and -.7028, p’s = .047 and .0016 for nuclear power and abortion, respectively).
Thus preferred social distance was significantly predicted by attitude extremity rather than moral
conviction for the issue of building nuclear power plants, and this effect was mediated by moral
relativism. Additionally, increasing attitude extremity predicted lower moral relativism for the abortion
issue, even after controlling for the effects of other attitude strength dimensions and moral conviction.
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Study 2 Discussion
The primary objectives of study 2 were to 1) identify potential antecedents to moral conviction,
and 2) test the universality, objectivity, and emotion hypotheses from the Integrated Theory of Moral
Conviction (ITMC). Based on results, personal relevance and attitude intensity are two potential
antecedents that merit further investigation. The universality hypothesis received partial support when
the relationship among moral conviction, moral relativism and social distance was examined, and the
objectivity and emotion hypotheses received experimental support.
Moral Conviction and Personal Relevance
High personal relevance increased moral conviction toward abortion, even after controlling for
attitude strength. This would seem counter to predictions of the ITMC, but an explanation based on
ego-involvement can reconcile this finding with the ITMC. A situation is ego-involving to the extent
that it helps sustain a person’s status, relations with others, or self-concept (Cho & Boster, 2005; Sherif
& Cantril, 1947). Encountering an ego-involving situation will thus frequently activate the self-concept
and related information. Because people tend to define themselves by their social and personal values,
making the self-concept intimately related to personal values and morals (Ostrom & Brock, 1968), when
the self-concept is activated (e.g., in ego-involving situations), personal values and morals may also be
activated. In the high personal relevance scenario for abortion, participants were asked to imagine a
situation where their partner has suggested an abortion for an unplanned pregnancy. This would be
considered an ego-involving situation since participants’ decisions would reflect upon them personally
and affect their potential status and relations. Thus this situation is likely to activate participants’ selfconcepts and related personal values/morals. Having activated these moral values, participants would be
more likely to relate them to the matter at hand (abortion), thereby increasing moral conviction. Egoinvolvement may also explain why personal relevance did not affect moral conviction for the issue of
building nuclear power plants.
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In the high personal relevance condition for building nuclear power plants, participants read
about a governmental decision to build a new nuclear power plant near the city in which they currently
resided. Participants would thus be personally affected, but they were not directly involved in the
decision. That is, the decision to build the nuclear power plant did not directly reflect upon them. As
such, it is possible that participants’ self-concepts, and by extension their personal moral values, were
not activated. The link between the issue and moral considerations would therefore be no more likely in
the high personal relevance condition than the low personal relevance condition.
Based on this interpretation, the activation of self-concept and associated personal moral values
mediates the effect of personal relevance (i.e., ego-involvement) on moral conviction. If this is the case,
the universality hypothesis of the Integrated Theory of Moral Conviction (ITMC; Skitka et al., 2008) is
not directly challenged by the finding that high personal relevance increases moral conviction toward
abortion. High personal relevance increased moral conviction simply because participants were better
able to recognize the link between their attitude and moral beliefs, not because they felt their moral
principles were more applicable when they were personally involved. The current study is unable to
directly examine this, however, and thus it is unclear whether the present results directly challenge the
universality hypothesis of the ITMC.
Moral Conviction and Attitude Strength
Moral conviction was significantly predicted by attitude importance, correctness, and intensity in
study 2. Attitude importance and correctness both significantly predicted moral conviction across both
issues when attitude intensity was omitted from analyses. This is not surprising given that attitude
importance and certainty (of which attitude correctness is a particular type) both significantly predicted
moral conviction in study 1. The relationship between high attitude correctness and stronger moral
conviction lends support to the objectivity hypothesis of the ITMC. This hypothesis argues that those
who hold attitudes with moral conviction are more likely to see their attitudes as objective facts about
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the world with clear right and wrong answers. This is supported by the finding that those who perceive
their attitude as the correct attitude also report higher moral conviction. When attitude intensity is
included in the analysis, however, this effect (along with the relationship between attitude importance
and moral conviction) is reduced to nonsignificance.
Of these attitude strength dimensions, attitude intensity appears to be the strongest predictor of
moral conviction. Attitude intensity measures the strength of one’s emotional reaction to a particular
attitude object and increasing attitude intensity predicted increasing moral conviction in the present
study. This finding lends support to the emotion hypothesis of the ITMC, which posits that attitudes
held with moral conviction are accompanied by stronger emotions than nonmoral attitudes. This also
corroborates accumulating evidence that emotion plays a key role in moral judgments and morality in
general (e.g., Greene et al., 2004; Haidt, 2001). While encouraging, the results of the present study are
purely correlational. The next logical step is to experimentally manipulate emotions to determine
whether emotions are true antecedents to moral conviction.
Moral Conviction and Social Distance
In earlier research, moral conviction was found to significantly predict preferred social distance
from those holding different attitudes, even after controlling for attitude strength (Skitka et al., 2005,
study 2). More specifically, when the social relationship was distant (e.g., personal physician,
neighbor), those high in moral conviction were less tolerant of different attitudes (i.e., preferred greater
social distance) than participants who were low in moral conviction. These findings indirectly support
the universality hypothesis. The present research included a measure of moral relativism to more
directly test whether those high in moral conviction perceive their attitudes as universally applicable.
Based on previous research and the universality hypothesis, it was hypothesized that high moral
conviction would predict lower moral relativism, and low moral relativism would predict greater
preferred social distance from those with different attitudes. This prediction was supported for abortion
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when attitude strength was not held constant. Participants who were high in moral conviction toward
abortion also exhibited lower levels of moral relativism on this issue, indicating that their stance on
abortion applied regardless of the people involved and the surrounding circumstances. Lower relativism
then predicted greater preferred social distance from distant relations (e.g., owner of store one frequents,
neighbor) who hold different views on the topic of abortion. Moreover, relativism significantly
mediated the effect of moral conviction on preferred social distance. These findings offer direct support
for the universality hypothesis. However, when attitude strength is held constant by including attitude
extremity, correctness, and intensity17 in the analysis, the relationship between moral conviction and
moral relativism switches directions. Instead of high moral conviction predicting lower moral
relativism, high moral conviction predicted higher moral relativism when attitude strength is controlled.
This finding contradicts previous findings (Skitka et al., 2005) as well as that which would be predicted
by the universality hypothesis. The presence of multicollinearity in these analyses suggests that this
may be due to significant conceptual overlap between the attitude dimensions and moral conviction.
However, results from the issue of building nuclear power plants and the exploratory analyses present a
further challenge for the universality hypothesis.
Moral conviction does not significantly predict moral relativism or preferred social distance for
building nuclear power plants. Instead, relativism and social distance are predicted by attitude
extremity, and moral relativism significantly mediates the effect of attitude extremity on preferred social
distance. In other words, the expected patterns were observed, only with attitude extremity in place of
moral conviction. This might be due to participants simply did not perceiving building nuclear power
plants as a moral issue – moral conviction was overall lower toward building nuclear power plants than
toward abortion, and lower numbers of participants expressed high moral conviction toward nuclear

17

Findings were identical when attitude importance was included instead of attitude intensity.
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power plants than abortion. However, the relationships among attitude extremity, moral relativism, and
social distance were also observed for abortion, which received high moral conviction ratings.
These results imply that when an issue is not perceived as highly related to moral considerations (e.g.,
building nuclear power plants), traditional attitude strength dimensions can be used to predict behavioral
intentions and social preferences. This is not a surprising or novel finding. More interestingly, when an
issue is perceived as related to moral considerations (e.g., abortion), the universality hypothesis of the
ITMC asserts that moral conviction provides additional, unique information regarding people’s
behavioral intentions and preferences (Skitka et al., 2005; Skitka & Bauman, 2008). The present results,
however, demonstrate that attitude strength dimensions (e.g., extremity) may be just as, if not more18,
informative. The successful interchange of moral conviction with attitude extremity in these analyses,
along with the presence of multicollinearity, suggests that moral conviction may be another attitude
strength dimension, albeit a strength dimension with its own characteristics.

Further research is

warranted to fully elucidate the utility of moral conviction versus attitude strength dimensions in
predicting behavioral intensions and social preferences.

18

Recall that when the effects of attitude strength were controlled, high moral conviction predicted higher moral relativism
for abortion. When attitude strength (correctness and intensity) and moral conviction were held constant, however, high
attitude extremity continued to predict lower moral relativism for abortion (p < .0001).
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General Discussion
Moral conviction is high when participants perceive that their attitude reflects or is related to
their moral beliefs. This suggests that antecedents to moral conviction function to create a conscious
link between an attitude and existing moral beliefs. Studies 1 and 2 identified three potential
antecedents to moral conviction – personal relevance, attitude intensity (emotions) and reliance on the
Harm moral foundation – which may all function in this manner.
Personal Relevance
Increasing personal relevance may create a conscious link between attitudes and moral beliefs by
activating one’s self-concept and the moral values used to define that self-concept. It is probable,
however, that creating this link requires the type of personal relevance that results in ego-involvement.
That is, the situation must relate to a person’s status, relations with others, or self-concept (Cho &
Boster, 2005; Sherif & Cantril, 1947). In such a scenario, the self-concept is more likely to be activated,
along with the important personal and social values the individual uses to define their self-concept.
Once moral values are activated, an association between those values and one’s attitude toward the
situation is more likely to be recognized and formed. If an association between one’s moral beliefs and
an attitude already exists, activating the self-concept and its associated moral values when that attitude is
again under consideration may further strengthen the association, boosting the perception that the
attitude is related to personal moral convictions. In this manner, ego-involving personal relevance may
create or increase moral conviction.
If this explanation is accurate there are interesting implications for the ITMC’s autonomy versus
heteronomy hypothesis. According to this hypothesis, attitudes held with moral conviction demonstrate
greater independence from the concerns or expectations of authorities and other important groups
(Mullen & Skitka, 2006; Skitka & Mullen, 2008). When these attitudes are activated, behaviors and
decisions are more likely to follow moral ideals than concerns about being accepted/respected by others.
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This hypothesis captures the manner in which preexisting moral convictions influence behaviors and
perceptions. However, it is possible that concerns about acceptance and respect play a role in the initial
formation of moral conviction. As previously stated, one element of ego-involving situations is that a
person’s status, relations, or self-concept becomes involved (Sherif & Cantril, 1947). We have argued
that ego-involvement activates personal moral values, leading a person to connect their attitude with
those moral values. This connection gives rise to moral conviction. But perceptions of status and
relations – elements of ego-involvement – inherently involve considerations of acceptance and respect
from others. The initial formation of moral conviction, then, may be less autonomous than the influence
of moral conviction on behaviors once it has been already established.
Attitude Intensity (Emotions)
Another way in which the link between an attitude and moral beliefs may form is through the
elicitation of emotion. In study 2, participants who reported having stronger emotional reactions to the
presented issues also reported stronger moral conviction. Future research would manipulate emotions to
determine whether emotion is a true antecedent of moral conviction, or simply associated with it. There
is reason to believe that emotions help create a link between an attitude and moral beliefs, though.
Recent work in the area of moral psychology suggests that emotional intuitions are the primary driving
force behind moral judgments (Haidt, 2001; Prinz, 2006; Wheatley & Haidt, 2005). In particular, fMRI
research indicates that emotional mechanisms are associated with moral judgments in which conformity
to a moral rule or standard is considered more important than the consequences (i.e., deontological or
non-utilitarian moral judgments) (Greene, Nystrom, Engell, Darley, & Cohen, 2004; Greene,
Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2001). While the exact mechanisms and manner in which
emotion informs moral judgment is still being clarified, it is possible that the experience of emotions
may facilitate forming a connection between an attitude and one’s moral beliefs. If a link between the
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attitude and moral beliefs already exists, the heightened experience of emotions may further strengthen
this connection. It is also possible that specific emotions play distinct roles in this process.
Some emotions appear to have stronger connections to morality than others (Haidt, 2003), and
the type of emotion that is elicited may depend upon the moral rule in question. For example, anger
would be elicited when a person is denied a job based on their race, and disgust when one reads about
siblings having sexual intercourse (Horberg, Oveis, & Keltner, 2011). Alternatively phrased, anger
would be elicited when a situation negatively relates to the Fairness moral foundation and disgust would
be elicited when a situation negatively relates to the Purity moral foundation. It is therefore possible that
perceiving an issue as related to the moral foundations (issue-relatedness variables in study 1) elicits
specific emotions (Horberg, Oveis & Keltner, 2011), which then predict moral conviction. For example,
perceiving the use of torture as negatively related to the foundation of Fairness would elicit anger, and
anger would then predict moral conviction. This is certainly another topic for future research.
Reliance on the Harm Foundation
The final variable identified as a potential antecedent to moral conviction is reliance on the Harm
foundation, as measured by the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ; Graham et al., 2011). Scores
on this particular variable indicate individual differences in how much harm factors into decisions of
right and wrong. Therefore a person who scores high on this variable weighs harm considerations
heavily when deciding the right or wrongness of any given situation. But why would higher reliance on
this particular foundation increase recognition that one’s attitude reflects one’s moral beliefs?
Although research by Jonathan Haidt and colleagues (2007; 2004) has established that there are a
number of moral domains other than Harm, it may be the case that the Harm moral domain is the most
basic or fundamental dimension of morality. Theories such as social-domain theory assert that
behaviors are classified as moral and immoral primarily on the basis of harmful (both physical and
social) consequences (Turiel, 1983). For example, hitting another child would be classified as immoral
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since it causes physical harm to the other child and social harm to the relationship (Tisak & Turiel,
1984). Even actions that appear fairly unrelated to harm (e.g., academic dishonesty) can be understood
in terms of the social harm they may cause by breaking social rules (Usoof-Thowfeek, Janoff-Bulman,
& Tavernini, 2011), and the harm/help dimension has been proposed as one of two underlying
dimensions of moral emotions (Gray & Wegner, 2011). If harm captures or encompasses the overall
foundation of morality, then it is possible that high reliance on the Harm foundation actually reflects
reliance on moral principles in general. High reliance on moral principles could then create an overall
tendency to link evaluations to one’s moral beliefs (i.e., a tendency to hold attitudes with moral
conviction).
Moral Attitudes
Much of the recent research on moral conviction has been based on the premise that attitudes
held with moral conviction – moral mandates – are qualitatively different and distinct from nonmoral
attitudes (see Skitka et al., 2005). Results from the present research identify several possible factors that
help establish a link between attitudes and moral beliefs. But other results (e.g., that various attitude
strength dimensions predict moral conviction) also served as a reminder that, at their core, moral
mandates are attitudes. The functional approach to the study of attitudes identifies four major functions
of attitudes, one of which is the value-expressive function (Katz, 1960). An attitude is serving this
function when it provides a venue through which an individual can positively express their central
values, which also provides an opportunity to convey the type of person they perceive themselves to be.
Thus the value-expressive function is intimately tied to doctrines of self-concept and ego (Katz, 1960).
Given that moral conviction may be increased by activating self-concepts and related moral values, high
moral conviction may indicate that one’s attitude is serving a specific value-expressive function – that of
expressing moral values. In other words, moral mandates may be another term for attitudes that function
to express moral values. As such, moral mandates assume their own distinct motivational state (Katz,
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1960), but future research on moral mandates will likely benefit from a renewed focus on their
fundamental identity as attitudes.
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Appendix A
Moral Foundations Questionnaire
When you decide whether something is right or wrong, to what extent are the following
considerations important to your thinking?

Whether or not someone
suffered emotionally
Whether or not someone
cared for someone weak or
vulnerable
Whether or not someone was
cruel
Whether or not some people
were treated differently from
others
Whether or not someone
acted unfairly
Whether or not someone was
denied his or her rights
Whether or not someone’s
actions showed love for his or
her country
Whether or not someone did
something to betray his or her
group
Whether or not someone
showed a lack of loyalty
Whether or not someone
showed a lack of respect for
authority
Whether or not someone
conformed to the traditions of
society
Whether or not an action
caused chaos or disorder
Whether or not someone
violated standards of purity
and decency
Whether or not someone did
something disgusting

Not at all
important

Not very
important

Slightly
important

Somewhat
important

Very
important

Extremely
important

1

2

3

4

5

6

1

2

3

4

5

6

1

2

3

4

5

6

1

2

3

4

5

6

1

2

3

4

5

6

1

2

3

4

5

6

1

2

3

4

5

6

1

2

3

4

5

6

1

2

3

4

5

6

1

2

3

4

5

6

1

2

3

4

5

6

1

2

3

4

5

6

1

2

3

4

5

6

1

2

3

4

5

6
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Whether or not someone
acted in a way that God
would approve of

1

2

3

4

5

6

Please indicate the level of your agreement with the following items:

Compassion for those who are
suffering is the most crucial virtue
One of the worst things a person
could do is hurt a defenseless
animal
It can never be right to kill a
human being
When the government makes laws,
the number one principle should
be ensuring that everyone is
treated fairly
Justice is the most important
requirement for a society
I think it’s morally wrong that rich
children inherit a lot of money
while poor children inherit nothing
I am proud of my country’s history
People should be loyal to their
family members, even when they
have done something wrong
It is more important to be a team
player than to express oneself
Respect for authority is something
all children need to learn
Men and women each have
different roles to play in society
If I were a soldier and disagreed
with my commanding officer’s
orders, I would obey anyway
because that is my duty
People should not do things that
are disgusting, even if no one is
harmed
I would call some acts wrong on
the grounds that they are
unnatural

Strongly
disagree

Moderately
disagree

Slightly
disagree

Slightly
agree

Moderately
agree

Strongly
agree

1

2

3

4

5

6

1

2

3

4

5

6

1

2

3

4

5

6

1

2

3

4

5

6

1

2

3

4

5

6

1

2

3

4

5

6

1

2

3

4

5

6

1

2

3

4

5

6

1

2

3

4

5

6

1

2

3

4

5

6

1

2

3

4

5

6

1

2

3

4

5

6

1

2

3

4

5

6

1

2

3

4

5

6
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Chastity is an important and
valuable virtue

1

2

88

3

4

5

6

Issue-relatedness Scale
Please indicate the extent to which you think [Issue] violates or supports the following:

Fair treatment
and equality
for all people
Respect for
authority
Protecting the
weak and
vulnerable
Loyalty to your
group (e.g.,
family,
ethnicity, etc.)
Standards of
decency and
purity
Basic human
rights
Respect for
traditions and
order
Wholesomeness
and virtues
(e.g.,
Godliness)
Love for your
country
Protecting
people from
physical or
emotional
harm

Violates

Somewhat
violates

Slightly
violates

Neither
violates
or
supports

Slightly
supports

Somewhat
supports

Supports

Strongly
supports

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Strongly
violates
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Religiosity Scale

I think about God all the
time.
I will always believe in
God.
I feel happy when I think
of God.
God does not help me to
make decisions.

Disagree

Slightly
Disagree

Neutral or
Neither

Slightly
Agree

Agree

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5
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Appendix B
Abortion Scenarios
Please try to imagine/visualize the following scenario with as much detail as possible.
High personal relevance
Male participants
You and your girlfriend have been dating for 10 months when you discover that she is 6 weeks pregnant.
You both work and attend school, but if you decide to have the baby one or both of you will need to quit
school to make financial ends meet. On top of that, the pregnancy is accompanied by a medical
condition that may complicate pregnancy and/or birth. You sit down together one evening and your
girlfriend suggests that it would be best to get an abortion.
Please indicate your agreement with your girlfriend’s decision to get an abortion:
(7-point scale ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree)

Female participants
You and your boyfriend have been dating for 10 months when you discover that you are 6 weeks
pregnant. You both work and attend school, so your money and time are already completely used up.
But if you decide to have the baby one or both of you will need to quit school to make financial ends
meet. On top of that, the pregnancy is accompanied by a medical condition that may complicate
pregnancy and/or birth. You sit down together one evening and your boyfriend suggests that it would be
best to get an abortion.
Please indicate your agreement with your boyfriend’s decision that you should get an abortion:
(7-point scale ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree)
Low personal relevance
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Seth and Julie have been dating for 10 months when they discover that she is 6 weeks pregnant. They
both work and attend school, but if they decide to have the baby one or both of them will need to quit
school to make financial ends meet. On top of that, the pregnancy is accompanied by a medical
condition that may complicate pregnancy and/or birth. They sit down together one evening and Julie
suggests that it would be best to get an abortion.
Please indicate your agreement with Julie’s decision to get an abortion:
(7-point scale ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree)
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Social Distance Scales

Abortion
Please indicate the extent to which you agree with each of the below sentence completions.
“I would be happy to have someone who does not share my views on abortion…”
Very
Neither
Somewhat
Somewhat
much Disagree
agree or
disagree
agree
disagree
disagree
…as president of
the United States.
…as someone I
would personally
date.
…as the teacher of
my children.
…as a neighbor.
…to marry into the
family.
…as my spiritual
advisor.
…to work in the
same place I do.
…as a roommate.
…as the owner of a
store or restaurant I
frequent.
…as my personal
physician.

Agree

Very
much
agree

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

93

Vita
Katherine R. G. White earned her Bachelor and Master’s degrees in Psychology at the University
of Texas at El Paso. She was awarded her Doctorate in Psychology in August 2012, also from the
University of Texas at El Paso. She is currently an Assistant Professor in the Psychology department at
Columbus State University in Columbus, GA.

Permanent address:

6382 Independence Dr.
Columbus, GA 31909

This thesis/dissertation was typed by Katherine R. G. White.

94

